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vForeword
Every girl and every boy should have the right to a quality education so 
that they can have more chances in life, including employment opportu-
nities, better health and also to participate in the political process. But 
education is not only a human right. Education reduces poverty, boosts 
economic growth, and increases income. It increases a person’s chances 
of having a healthy life, reduces maternal deaths, and combats diseases 
such as HIV and AIDS. Education can promote gender equality, reduce 
child marriage, and promote peace. It is for this reason that education 
figures prominently in the Human Capital Project launched by the World 
Bank in 2018.
Great progress has been achieved in enrolling children in school 
around the world, and in Togo. The progress made is encouraging as 
many disparities between poor and rich, urban and rural areas and girls 
and boys have disappeared following the abolishment of school fees.
As this book demonstrates using a wealth of empirical data, it’s not 
enough to get children in school. We also need to ensure that they learn 
to read, count, and acquire the necessary life skills. Too often this is not the 
case. Good teachers are essential to solving the learning crisis and closing 
the gap between poor and good quality education. Therefore, it is vital that 
all children have teachers that are well-trained, motivated, are able to iden-
tify weak learners, and are supported by well-managed education systems.
The benefits of a good education are transmitted from generation 
to generation and across communities at large, making investments 
in quality education, one of the best investments a country can make. 
vi   FOREWORD
Identifying how to improve learning is an involved process, which needs 
to bring together all stakeholders. Parents, national officials, and devel-
opment partners need to work closely together.
Addressing the learning crisis Togo experiences, is challenging as 
there are no magic bullets. Fixing education systems requires more 
than handing out textbooks and building schools. It requires systems to 
change. Good analytics as presented in this book, are a first step towards 
a solution. Then will follow the much more challenging step of, as the 
last chapter puts it, uncovering what works trying different approaches 
and scaling up what works best. Or, to put it differently: to learn how to 
improve learning. The journey has just begun. The World Bank is ready 
to play its part.
Lomé, Togo  Hawa Wague
Resident Representative for 
the World Bank in Togo
vii
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Waly Wane, Aboudrahyme Savadogo, 
Pamela Mulet and an anonymous referee for their thoughtful comments 
and suggestions. Christopher Rockmore kindly guided us through the 
use of the SDI dataset; Felicien Accrombessy helped prepare summary 
statistics from the 2016 QUIBB. The team benefitted from discussions 
with Eva Bernard and the encouragement of Andrew Dabalen, Manager 
at the Poverty and Equity Global Practice of the World Bank.
ix
contents
1 Learning in Sub-Saharan Africa  1
Johannes Hoogeveen and Mariacristina Rossi
2 Primary Education in Togo  7
Johannes Hoogeveen and Mariacristina Rossi
3 Drivers of Performance  27
Johannes Hoogeveen, Mariacristina Rossi  
and Dario Sansone
4 Student Learning and Teacher Competence  59
Johannes Hoogeveen, Marcello Matranga  
and Mariacristina Rossi
5 Policy Suggestions and Concluding Remarks  83
Johannes Hoogeveen and Mariacristina Rossi
Index  95
xi
notes on contributors
Johannes Hoogeveen is Lead Economist in the Poverty and Equity 
Global Practice, World Bank, USA. He has worked extensively across the 
Africa region, (amongst others) as country economist for Togo.
Marcello Matranga graduated from the University of Turin with 
a Master’s degree in Economics in 2017. He is Research Assistant 
at CERP Collegio Carlo Alberto and Ph.D student in Economics at 
University of Turin, Italy. His research interests are focused on the areas 
of Development Economics and Economics of Education.
Mariacristina Rossi is Associate Professor at the University of Turin, 
Italy, and Research Affiliate at Netspar, The Netherlands; Collegio Carlo 
Alberto, Italy; and National Scientific Council, CNR, Italy. She has pub-
lished extensively on applied development economics and intertemporal 
household choices.
Dario Sansone is a Ph.D. Candidate in Economics at Georgetown 
University, USA. He is an applied microeconomist working on labor and 
development. His work focuses on education and gender.
xiii
list oF Figures
Fig. 1.1 Proficiency in primary education across Africa  3
Fig. 2.1 Primary school enrollment (all school types)  11
Fig. 2.2 Inequalities in school attendance (2006 and 2013/2014)  15
Fig. 2.3 Spending on primary education  16
Fig. 2.4 Number and types of classrooms and availability of books  17
Fig. 2.5 Impact of Togo’s major education reforms  19
Fig. 2.6 School drop out by gender and grade in 2016/2017  20
Fig. 2.7 Performance on PASEC learning tests  21
Fig. 2.8 Percent in grade 6 performing satisfactory on PASEC  
learning test  22
Fig. 3.1 Primary school enrollment inequalities  30
Fig. 3.2 Primary school enrollment  30
Fig. 3.3 School characteristics: 2010–2011  31
Fig. 3.4 School performance by canton in 2010/2011 (Note School 
performance is defined as the number of students that have 
been admitted to participating in the primary school leaving 
exam over the total number of students in the school)  33
Fig. 3.5 Distribution of teachers of different grade levels by region  34
Fig. 3.6 Teacher spending per student and school performance  
(public schools only)  34
Fig. 3.7 Performance by school type and by region (Note Schools  
whose pass rate was equal to 0 have been dropped)  36
Fig. 3.8 Ratio of female over male students by grade in rural and urban 
areas (Note Male students are the complement to one of female 
student)  37
xiv   LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 4.1 Distribution of pupils’ average scores across public (0)  
and private (1)  68
Fig. 4.2 Distribution of pupils’ French test scores  69
Fig. 4.3 Distribution of pupils’ math test scores  70
Fig. 5.1 Percent schools by percent of students that answers  
at least 70% of math questions correctly  85
Fig. 5.2 School attendance by socioeconomic status  86
xv
list oF tAbles
Table 2.1 Changes to the primary school system  12
Table 2.2 Composition of teaching staff in public and private sector  14
Table 2.3 Internal efficiency indicators  15
Table 2.4 Budget for the education sector, 2006–2015  24
Table 3.1 Number of schools by region  35
Table 3.2  Frontier analysis for ratio of admitted CEPD students over 
total students in school  39
Table 3.3 Predicted school performance, by quintile and region  42
Table 3.4 Enrollment probability (6–15). Probit and Logit  45
Table 3.5 Enrollment probability (6–15)  51
Table 3.6 School achievements (6–15). Heckman  53
Table 3.7 Summary statistics  56
Table 4.1 SDI key results  61
Table 4.2 Descriptive SDI test results  67
Table 4.3 Test score correlations  70
Table 4.4 SDI test scores of pupils by region and rural and urban areas  71
Table 4.5 Distribution of teachers’ test scores  72
Table 4.6  SDI test scores for teachers by region and rural  
and urban areas  73
Table 4.7 Analysis of variance of SDI test scores  73
Table 4.8 Summary of variables used in the regression analysis  75
Table 4.9 Regression analysis on pupils’ scores  77
Table 4.10  Key SDI results for schools in Togo and selected  
African countries  80
xvii
list oF boxes
Box 4.1 SDI test  64
Box 5.1 Community participation and school performance  87
1CHAPTER 1
Learning in Sub-Saharan Africa
Johannes Hoogeveen and Mariacristina Rossi
Abstract  This introductory chapter provides an overview of this book, 
which investigates educational outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa with ref-
erence to one specific country: Togo.
Keywords  Africa · Togo · Education · School enrollment · Learning 
outcomes
1.1  introduction
Across Africa, the vision that education can be a powerful device to 
transform lives is widely shared. Unsurprisingly, most parents in the 
region will say that their priority is assuring a good education for 
their children. This is reflected in the results from the latest round of 
the World Values Survey (2010–2014): almost 80% of African parents 
responded to be worried or very worried about their ability to give their 
children a good education.
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The importance given to education by parents is echoed in the eco-
nomics literature, which finds that a country’s education level is critical 
for its economic success. For many years, this literature focused on the 
positive effects of the quantity of education on growth (Barro 1991; 
Mankiw et al. 1992). Also, in practice much effort goes into assuring 
that every child has the opportunity to attend school. Driven in large 
part by the Millennium Development Goal of achieving a 100% pri-
mary completion by 2015, many countries in Africa put in place poli-
cies that abolished school fees and assured free and universal primary 
education. These efforts have largely been successful, at times extremely 
successful. In Uganda, for instance, the removal of direct costs to school-
ing increased primary enrollment by over 60% and lowered cost-related 
dropouts by over 33 percentage points (Deininger 2003). The expansion 
of schooling across the continent is remarkable in its scope and speed. 
Was in 1970 the gross primary enrollment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa 
68%, presently it is over 100%. Average years of schooling of people aged 
15 and over increased from 3.89 in 1990 to 5.23 by 2010. Over the 
same period, those with no schooling at all dropped from 44 to 32% 
(Barro and Lee 2013).
More recently a growing body of evidence suggests it is not only the 
quantity of schooling, measured by average years of schooling or enroll-
ment rates but also the quality of schooling, proxied by student achieve-
ment tests, that contributes to growth. Enrollment, despite being the 
first step, is not equivalent to education. Enrollment alone is not enough 
to generate sufficient knowledge capital that economies need to grow. 
Education needs to equip each child with adequate competencies in lit-
eracy, numeracy and science. It is not about being in school but what 
is learned in school that matters (Hanushek and Kimko 2000; Pritchett 
2001; Hanushek and Woessmann 2007, 2012).
Unfortunately, there is often a trade-off between going to school and 
learning. Particularly when enrollment rates increase rapidly, learning 
outcomes tend to suffer. In a recent paper, Hoogeveen and Rossi (2013) 
showed for Tanzania that the impact of the introduction of free primary 
education school reform had a negative impact on grade achievements. 
The results also point at an unequal effect, as the negative impact was 
particularly marked for those living in rural areas and originating from 
poor families. Perhaps unsurprisingly in view of the rapid expansion of 
Africa’s primary education system, learning outcomes are increasingly of 
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concern (Bashir et al. 2018). Evidence from the global dataset on educa-
tion quality compiled by Altinok et al. (2017) demonstrates the degree to 
which African primary school systems perform unsatisfactorily. Across the 
region, school systems are unable to meet the lower bar for proficiency, 
set at a score of 400. The higher benchmark of intermediate proficiency 
(set at 475) is entirely out of reach, even though it is achieved in Central 
and Eastern Asia, Europe and North America. Within sub-Saharan Africa 
there are large differences, however. With an average score of 253, fran-
cophone West Africa performs worse than the remainder of the region 
that has an average score of 331; within francophone West Africa Togo 
does better than the average with a score of 270 (Figure 2.8 suggests this 
is driven by Togo’s performance on mathematics and not by proficiency 
in French for which Togo trails countries in the sub-region)1 (Fig. 1.1).
The consequences of such low learning outcomes are severe. 
According to the Brookings Institution’s Center for Universal 
Education, and drawing data from its Africa Learning Barometer,2 61 
million children (half of the primary school-age population) “will reach 
their adolescent years without being able to read, write or perform basic 
numeracy tasks.” Their study identified 12 countries in Africa, namely, 
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Fig. 1.1 Proficiency in primary education across Africa (Source Authors’ 
 calculations using the Altinok et al. data base)
1 The Altinok et al. dataset does not include the data from the latest SACMEQ III 
round, so for a recent comparison across the subregion, the reader should refer to Fig. 2.8.
2 http://www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/africa-learning-barometer.
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Malawi, Zambia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Congo, South Africa, Namibia and Comoros in which not even 30% of 
children meet the minimum standard of learning by grade five of pri-
mary school. But the consequences of poor education go much beyond 
limited learning. Quality education has been linked to better labor mar-
ket outcomes and higher levels of income (Hanushek et al. 2017), less 
poverty (Jung and Thorbecke 2003) and improved health and nutrition. 
It has also been associated with lower fertility, less inequality, a smaller 
probability of incarceration and even a higher propensity for happiness 
(Cuñado and de Gracia 2012).
This book delves deeper into questions of enrollment and learning 
outcomes. In particular, it asks the question what, given increased enroll-
ment rates, a country can do to bring its learning outcomes up to stand-
ard. We explore the scope for improvements, by enhancing the efficiency 
with which resources are used, by improving the qualifications of teach-
ers but also through greater community involvement in school man-
agement. We find that there is certainly scope for improvement. Yet we 
conclude that changes at the margin will be insufficient to bring about 
the transformation that is needed to not only achieve intermediate pro-
ficiency levels but to go beyond this and attain intermediate proficiency 
levels. What could be done to transform the education system is dis-
cussed in the last chapter.
The focus of this book is on one country, Togo. By picking one coun-
try we are able to go into greater depth. Togo was selected because the 
challenges its education system faces are broadly comparable to those 
in other education systems in sub-Saharan Africa. The choice of Togo 
was facilitated by the fact that a broad range of micro data is available, 
including household surveys, learning surveys as well as detailed adminis-
trative data on budgets and the school system. We draw on these data for 
this book.
The rest of this book is laid out as follows. Chapter 2 gives an over-
view of the educational system and outcomes in Togo. Chapter 3 uses 
an efficiency frontier approach and examines the regional differences in 
educational outcomes in Togo. Chapter 4 illustrates the determinants of 
children’s learning outcomes using survey data by including information 
on school characteristics and teacher proficiency. Conclusions follow in 
Chapter 5.
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Appendix
Data Used in This Study
Several datasets are going to be used in the remainder of this book. In 
addition to PASEC, which covers learning by pupils in grade two and 
five of primary school children, we will make use of selected years of the 
school census containing data for all schools. This administrative data set 
contains much information on schools itself but lacks information on the 
demand side, i.e. characteristics of the household from which the stu-
dents originate. From this dataset a pronounced heterogeneity stands 
out. The best performing schools are private schools; Kara, Lomé and 
the Central region are the regions with the highest levels of perfor-
mance. There is also a clear gender dimension in school performances, 
which suggests that in all regions and across all school types boys per-
form better than girls, in contrast to the OECD evidence which shows 
opposite direction. Results will be shown in Chapter 3. In this chap-
ter we also make use of survey data, QUIBB, to relate school perfor-
mance to household characteristics and control for wealth indicators. 
The survey data refer to 2006 and 2011 and contain 7500 interviewed 
households during the first wave, including 36,430 individuals, whereas 
5532 households and 29,781 individuals took part to the second wave. 
These cross-sectional datasets are extremely useful for the purpose of 
our research as they provide information on household composition, 
education, health, employment, assets, current expenditure, auto- 
consumption and income. Moreover, the dataset contains school attend-
ance in the past week rather than school enrollment as in the administra-
tive data, shedding light on the actual decision on going to school rather 
than being (merely) enrolled. In Chapter 4, we make use of survey data 
complementary to PASEC, the SDI data, which focus on pupils in their 
fourth grade. SDI data contain, in addition to pupils’ data, information 
on teachers’ such as their working history as well as their knowledge in 
math and French.
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7CHAPTER 2
Primary Education in Togo
Johannes Hoogeveen and Mariacristina Rossi
Abstract  This chapter offers an overview of primary education in Togo, 
spanning the two last decades. Togo made important progress. School 
enrollment increased considerably and the percentage of school-aged 
children not attending school dropped significantly. At the same time, 
learning outcomes give reason for concern as the quality of education 
appears to be wanting. This challenge is not specific to Togo; it affects 
other African school systems as well though its seriousness varies from 
country to country.
Keywords  School enrollment · Learning outcomes · Togo · Free 
primary education
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2.1  primAry educAtion since the yeAr 2000
Togo is a sovereign state in West Africa bordered by Ghana to the west, 
Benin to the east and Burkina Faso to the north. It extends south to the 
Gulf of Guinea, where its capital Lomé is located. Togo covers 57,000 
square kilometers making it one of the smallest countries in Africa and 
has a population of less than 8 million. The country has known a long 
period of economic decline and political upheaval that started in the early 
1990s and which formally ended with the parliamentary elections of 
October 2007. The education sector suffered greatly during this period. 
Financial constraints prevented the renewal and upgrading of the teach-
ing profession and the renovation or construction of education facilities 
at a pace sufficient to meet constantly growing needs for education.
With the limited spending of the public sector in education and as 
the crisis deepened, parents responded by sending their children to pri-
vate schools. So, while between 2000 and 2005 the number of students 
attending public primary school increased by 5%, the number of stu-
dents going to private schools (for profit and religious establishments, 
but also local initiative schools referred to in French as École d’Initiative 
Locale (EDIL)) increased by 20%. Nationwide, 40% of students attended 
a private–public school in 2000; by 2005 this had increased to 43%. In 
rural areas one saw a proliferation of EDIL schools, which relied entirely 
on local community financing and family support. The importance of 
private education is illustrated by the fact that in the year 2000 more 
than half the schools in the Savanes, one of the poorest regions of the 
country, were non-public 43% were of the EDIL type; another 17% were 
private schools. While in other rural areas public provision continued to 
be more important than private provision, in urban areas private provi-
sion outstripped public provision as well. In the year 2000 but also in 
2010 the proportion of urban students enrolled in private institutions 
was around 66%.1
As donor support was withdrawn during the crisis the public educa-
tion sector relied entirely on financing by the State. Capital spending was 
reduced, hiring was limited and the education system started to rely 
more on so-called contract teachers—temporary and auxiliary teachers 
who work for a fraction of the wages of civil servants but who are also 
1 Of these few attended EDIL schools as this kinds of school is almost exclusively found 
in rural areas.
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less qualified (UNESCO, UNICEF 2014). These developments explain, 
as will be demonstrated later, why the quality of education declined so 
rapidly during this period.
Parents had good reason to opt for private alternatives as the quality of 
public education was deteriorating as evidenced by the fact that even though 
the number of students increased in public schools, the number of teach-
ers declined by 12%, resulting in rising student–teacher ratios (from 1:36 in 
2000 to 1:43 in 2005). On a positive note the teachers that left tended to 
be those with less education themselves, those with a primary or  secondary 
school diploma, while the number of teachers with a baccalaureate 
increased. As a consequence, the ratio of teachers with only a primary or sec-
ondary school diplomas decreased from 80 to 75%. In private (non-EDIL) 
schools, the increase in teachers kept pace with the increase in students and 
student–teacher ratios remained constant at 1:32. In private schools too, 
teacher qualifications went up, in a way that was more pronounced than 
in public schools. Had in 2000 some 75% a primary or secondary school 
diploma, by 2005 this percentage had dropped to less than 50%.
During the crisis years, Togo’s citizens thus demonstrated to value 
education. Remarkably throughout the years of economic hardship 
enrollment levels remained high in comparison with most other West 
African countries. In fact, they even increased. The net primary school 
enrollment rate for children aged 6–11 years rose from 63% in 2000 to 
73% in 2006 and the gross rate for the same age group increased from 
103 to 115%.
Encouraged by the success of the 2007 elections and the new govern-
ment’s reform platform, which included the abolition of school fees starting 
in the 2008/2009 school year and the gradual integration of EDIL schools 
in the public school system, donors reengaged with the country after more 
than 15 years of providing limited assistance. By 2010 an strategic Education 
Sector Plan (PSE) had been formulated and adopted and money from exter-
nal education financiers started flowing again.2
Following the introduction of free primary education, enrollment 
rates increased rapidly. Additional teachers were hired and by 2016 the 
number of public school teachers had almost doubled from 14,000 
in 2006 to over 24,000. As student numbers increased in lock-step, 
2 A free-fee education policy was already established in the 1992 Constitution, but 
remained unimplemented. In 2000, tuition fees for girls were reduced, to encourage their 
enrollment, and in 2007–2008, all primary-school fees were abolished.
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student–teacher ratios did not change, and remained at 1:43. The edu-
cation background of teachers did improve however and the fraction 
of teachers with a primary or secondary school diploma dropped to 
62%. As public-primary education became free, the number of  students 
attending private schools stabilized at around 450,000 students, 
while the share of students attending private schools dropped to 30% 
in 2016—down from 43% a decade earlier. Unlike in public schools the 
qualifications of private-school teachers did not improve further and the 
student–teacher ratio, though still favorable relative to public schools, 
increased to 1:34 (up from 1:32 a decade earlier).
Not only did more children receive an education, the new policies 
of absorbing EDIL schools in the public school system and abolishing 
school fees were pro-poor as the children that benefited most originated 
from the poorest households in rural areas. And as more children were 
going to school (net enrollment reached 94% in 2016/2017), other, 
spatial and gender, inequalities reduced as well.
Remarkably for a system that had to deal with a large influx of new 
students and the absorption of EDIL schools, internal efficiency also 
went up: many more children passed their primary school leaver exam 
and fewer children repeated their grade or dropped out completely. 
So, in almost all respects the education reforms initiated in 2007 were 
a resounding success. The number of children who completed  primary 
school doubled over the course of a decade, an increase that was 
achieved while improving the efficiency of the education system and 
without affecting pass rates in any negative way. If anything, a larger frac-
tion of children was successful at their exam.
2.2  closer look At the introduction oF Free  
primAry educAtion
Togo’s educational system is divided into four levels: (i) a three-year 
pre-school cycle designed for 3–5 year olds; (ii) a six-year primary cycle 
designed for 6–11 year olds; (iii) a seven-year secondary education cycle 
designed for 12–18 year olds, consisting of a four-year junior level and a 
three-year senior level and (iv) a higher education system. There is also 
technical and vocational training at the junior and senior secondary levels 
and literacy training. The focus of this book is on the six-year primary 
cycle, which can be sub-divided into three groups: CP1 and CP2, the 
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first two years, CE1 and CE2, years three and four, and CM1 and CM2, 
years five and six. At the end of year six, students sit for an end of school 
exam, the CPED.
Prior to the start of the 2008/2009 school year, which normally runs 
from September till June the following year, the Government of Togo 
announced it would abolish school fees for primary education. After a 
decade of slow growth in which increases in enrollment remained below 
the population growth trend, the introduction of free primary  education 
led to a rapid increase in enrollment. The biggest increase was regis-
tered during the first year primary education was free, after which fol-
lowed a period in which primary school enrollment largely kept pace 
with population growth (Fig. 2.1). The inflow of new students came as 
a shock to the system. Between 2006/2007 and 2008/2009 the num-
ber of students attending public primary school increased from 590,000 
to 777,000 a 32% increase. In the course of 2 years, 500 new schools 
and 2300 teachers were absorbed into the public education system, an 
increase of 19 respectively 17%. Not all these schools were newly con-
structed, nor were all additional teachers new hires. Some 228 newly 
incorporated schools were former EDIL schools that were now absorbed 
into the public school system along with their students and teachers.
 800,000
 900,000
 1,000,000
 1,100,000
 1,200,000
 1,300,000
 1,400,000
 1,500,000
 1,600,000
Actual
Population trend
Fig. 2.1 Primary school enrollment (all school types) (Source Authors’ cal-
culations using Government of Togo, National Yearbooks of School Statistics. 
Various years)
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Table 2.1 illustrates the changes the primary school system went 
through with the introduction of free primary education. To this end we 
compare the school system in the year shortly before the reforms were 
introduced (2006/2007) with the system 10 years later. Over the course 
of a decade, the number of students increased by almost 50% from one 
million, to a million and a half. Schools became bigger on average as the 
number of schools increased by less than the increase in the number of 
students: 31%. Also, the number of students per classroom and the num-
ber of students per teacher increased, though not by much as the num-
ber of classrooms increased by 42% and the number of teachers by 46%.
As one might expect, the share of students going to public schools 
increased. Surprisingly, though, this increase did not come at the expense 
of private (religious and non-religious) schools which, unlike public schools 
did not abolish school fees. The increase in the fraction of students going 
to public schools is largely the results of EDIL schools being absorbed in 
the public school system. Noteworthy is that amongst the private schools, 
Catholic schools became less popular. Private non-religious schools picked 
up the students that stopped going to Catholic schools.
As teaching staff is a critical input into education, it is worth consider-
ing how its composition evolved before and after the introduction of free 
primary education. Of note is that both in public and private schools the 
number of teachers increased substantially. Moreover, within the pub-
lic school system there is a strong weakness due to the composition of 
teachers with respect to their contract and payment. The public system 
relies more substantially than the private one on teaching assistants/vol-
unteers and temporary staff, staff who tend to get paid half or less than 
half, compared to what their civil servant colleagues make.3 In private 
education establishments such staff made up more than 10% of the total 
staff complement in 2006/2007 and in 2016/2017 only 2%. Compare 
this to the public school system where half the teachers are assistants 
or people with temporary contracts. The private school system also 
increased the fraction of female staff, from 14% in 2006/2007 to 21% in 
2016/2017. In the public sector little changed: female teachers make up 
some 14% of the total teaching complement (Table 2.2).
3 Temporary teachers are in their probationary period and will either be confirmed as 
civil servants or dismissed. Their earnings are lower than civil servants. Assistant/volunteer 
teachers are individuals who do not have the necessary qualifications to be recruited as 
temps and therefore work as assistants in hopes of being integrated to the civil service rolls 
at a later date. These individuals earned less than 5000 FCFA/month ($10) in 2013.
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Such major reforms come with growing pains, if only because all of a 
sudden, a large cohort of students entered CP1. Between 2006/2007 
and 2008/2009 the number of children in public school CP1 increased 
from 127,000 to 208,000, a 64% increase. As this bulge of students 
worked itself through the primary school system, the situation gradu-
ally normalized in subsequent years. Consequently, four years later, in 
2012/2013, the number of students in CP1 was 139,000. Student–
teacher ratios, already high at 44.4 students per teacher in 2006/2007 
increased to 49.7 two years later and returned to 44.4 by 2012/2013.
Despite the stresses under which the education system was put, the sys-
tem’s internal efficiency improved across the board. In its wake, almost all 
gender disparities were eliminated as well. The fraction of six-year-old chil-
dren attending school increased significantly, especially after 2012. The frac-
tion of pupils not passing to the next grade declined dramatically from almost 
one in four between 2006 and 2008 to one in thirteen by 2016/2017 fol-
lowing the adoption of a decree at the beginning of the 2012/2013 school 
year which limited the ability of schools to let pupils repeat grades. Also the 
number of pupils who abandoned school dropped (Table 2.3).
The increase in enrollment reduced inequalities. Poverty in Togo 
broadly follows a north–south axis with poverty being worst in the north 
and lower in the south. Like poverty, and before the abolition of pri-
mary school fees, attendance rates in regions in northern Togo (Savanes 
and Kara) were much lower than elsewhere in the country. This can be 
illustrated with survey data, showing that in 2006 attendance rates in the 
northern regions were as low as 52% in 2006 in Savanes. By 2013/2014 
attendance rates in this region had increased by 25% age points to 77%. 
As a consequence the gap with the best performing region (Lomé) 
reduced from 40% in 2006 to 12% in 2013/2014. The large increase 
in school enrollment and attendance turned out to be a great equalizer. 
Table 2.2 Composition of teaching staff in public and private sector
Source Authors’ calculations using Government of Togo, National Yearbooks of School Statistics. 
Various Years
Public Total Civil 
servant 
(%)
Assistant 
(%)
Temp (%) Private 
(%)
Male (%) Female 
(%)
2006/2007 13,290 42 40 18 0 87 13
2016/2017 24,490 40 37 23 0 86 14
Private
2006/2007 9060 16 5 4 75 86 14
2016/2017 13,178 12 2 0 85 79 21
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Girls caught up relatively to boys, children living in poor households 
reduced the gap relative to those living in better-off households as did 
those living in rural areas. Inequalities did not fully disappear, but by 
2013/2014, five years after introducing free primary education, they had 
reduced considerably as the difference between the best (Lomé) and the 
worst (Savanes) performing region dropped from 40 to 18%, between 
rural and urban areas from 17 to 6% and between the poorest and 
wealthiest quintile from 25 to 9% (Fig. 2.2).
A decade after the introduction of free primary education, in 2017, 
almost 100,000 children in public primary school successfully completed 
their primary school leaver exam. Some 130,000 pupils sat for the exam, 
Table 2.3 Internal efficiency indicators
Source Government of Togo, National Yearbook of School Statistics, for 2012/2013 and 2016/2017 
and PASEC 2012 for 2006/2007 and 2007/2008
2006/2007 2007/2008 2012/2013 2016/2017
Children aged 6 attending school
Girls 46.5 47.0 54.8 72.6
Boys 49.6 50.3 56.0 72.9
Percent of pupils not passing to the next grade
Girls 23.4 24.0 18.6 7.6
Boys 22.8 23.3 18.4 7.7
Percent of pupils who started but did not complete primary school
Girls 38.0 38.5 30.4
Boys 24.1 34.4 30.2
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Fig. 2.2 Inequalities in school attendance (2006 and 2013/2014) (Source 
2006 data—MICS; 2013/2014 data—DHS)
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implying a success rate of 77%. This was a remarkable achievement, as 
over the course of a decade the number of students who successfully com-
pleted primary school had effectively doubled. In 2006/2007 49,000 
passed the CEPD exam out of 71,000 who sat for it, a pass rate of 69%. 
As pass rates improved, they improved more for girls whose likelihood of 
passing improved from 64 to 75%, than for boys (from 71 to 78%). These 
achievements are even more remarkable when one realizes that not only 
pass rates improved, students arrived in grade 6 faster as grade repetition 
rates had reduced remarkably. Where in 2006/2007 one in four children 
repeated their grade, a decade later this had dropped to less than 10%.
Such a reform effort does not come cheap. In fact, between 2006 and 
2015 the budget for primary education almost quadrupled from FCFA 
14 billion in 2006 to FCFA 56 billion in 2015. So while the number 
of public students almost doubled during that period, real spending per 
student increased as well, by as much as nearly 80% from FCFA 23,000 
to FCFA 43,000. This was possible, in part, because during this period 
the economy of Togo recovered from crisis levels. GDP growth became 
positive again and revenue collection improved considerably. Expressed as 
a fraction of GDP spending on primary education almost doubled from 
1.3 of GDP in 2006 to 2.4% in 2015, but as revenue collection improved 
rapidly following the crisis the increase as expressed in percent of the 
budget was less (from 5.6% in 2006 to 6.8% in 2015). In fact, for most 
of the period the share of primary education in public spending remained 
relatively constant hovering around 7% of revenue collected (Fig. 2.3).
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Fig. 2.3 Spending on primary education (Source Authors’ calculations using 
Government of Togo, National Yearbooks of School Statistics. Various years)
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As spending increased a sector that had neglected investments during 
the crisis years, ramped up. The investment budget increased by a fac-
tor 8 from around FCFA 2 billion in 2008 to more than 16 billion in 
2011, a level at which it remained for the next 3 years, before starting 
to taper off in 2014 (see Annex Table 2.4). As a result, the total num-
ber of classrooms increased from 22,272 in 2009 to 24,926 in 2016, 
while a number of classrooms made from stamped earth were converted 
into more permanent materials. Despite these investments, considerable 
regional differences in the type of construction materials used for schools 
continued to persist: particularly in the poorer regions of Plateaux and 
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Fig. 2.4 Number and types of classrooms and availability of books (Source 
Authors’ calculations using Government of Togo, National Yearbooks of School 
Statistics. Various years)
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Savanes the fraction of schools constructed out of permanent materials 
tends to be low. These are the same regions were in the past the high-
est number of EDIL schools were found. And as such schools tended to 
be community-financed, the majority of these schools were constructed 
from less permanent materials (Fig. 2.4).
The story for the availability of text books at school also points to 
significant improvements—at least initially. These improvements came 
on the back of a large joint Government and donor effort to ensure 
that at least every student had one book for maths and one book for 
reading. This effort was largely successful as evidenced by the data for 
2012/2013, a year in which 3 million text free books were distributed, 
but its effects seem to be petering out. One positive aspect to note is that 
in Savanes, the poorest and usually most underserved region in the coun-
try the availability of textbooks is highest (Fig. 2.5).
2.3  leArning outcomes
While success rates at the school leaver exam improved, not all students 
advance to a stage where they can sit for the school leaver exam. Drop-
out rates remain elevated. Almost one in five children quit during or after 
their first year at school. Of those who remain, most make it till grade 
5 (CM1) when another 10% drops out. All in all, of every 100 children 
starting primary school, only 70 complete it. This number is the same for 
boys and for girls, but there is a marked difference when they drop out. 
During the first year of school, boys have a bigger likelihood of drop-
ping; in grade 5 girls are more likely to drop out (Fig. 2.6).
For those who remain in school learning assessments show a decline 
in performance. PASEC collects data on learning achievements for 
pupils in grade 2 and in grade 5 (grade 6 in 2014). Assessments were 
carried out in the years 1999/2000, in 2009/2010, one year after the 
introduction of free primary education and in 2013/2014.4 The first 
4 The “Programme d’Analyse des Systèmes Éducatifs” (PASEC, or “Programme of Analysis 
of Education Systems”) was launched by the Conference of Ministers of Education of French-
Speaking Countries (CONFEMEN). These surveys are conducted in French-speaking countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa in primary school (grade 2 and 5) for Mathematics and French. Each round 
includes ten countries. PASEC I occurred from 1996 to 2003; PASEC II from 2004 to 2010 and 
PASEC III was conducted in 2014. The PASEC assessment tools evolved over time, and the raw 
PASEC score are not comparable. Yet each PASEC round defines a cut-off score above which 
performance may be considered satisfactory. We use the percent performing satisfactory in each 
round to make comparisons, whereby we use the PASEC score obtained by the end-of-the year 
test for year when PASEC also carried out a test at the beginning of the school year.
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The number of students and schools in the public system almost doubled, in part because students 
from locally managed schools (EDIL) were absorbed in the public school system.The number of 
students going to private schools also doubled. About one in five students goes to a private school.
The impact was largest in the regions outside the capital Lomé.
Student teacher ratios became very high in some regions, but have since returned to levels closer 
to the norm of one teacher per 40 students. Inequities reduced considerably as evidenced by the 
improvement in the gender balance.
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assessment implemented nine years prior to the introduction of free 
primary education was introduced, finds that the majority of students 
in grade 2 and grade 5 performed satisfactory on both the French and 
mathematics tests. This changed in the second round implemented in 
2009/2010. Now the majority of students whether in second or in fifth 
grade are no longer performing adequately. Only 40% of students in 
grade 2 perform satisfactory on the French test, and even less (29%) in 
grade 5. The latter is remarkable as students in grade 2 are part of large 
cohort of students who benefited from free primary education. Hence 
given the stress the arrival of large numbers of additional students in 
CP1 put on the education system, one might expect that for this cohort 
learning outcomes were lower. Indeed, evidence from e.g. Tanzania sug-
gests that large influxes of students have a negative impact on learning 
achievement (Hoogeveen and Rossi 2013). What the Togo data show 
is that this negative impact spilled over to students in other grades, even 
though they started their education career prior to the introduction of 
free primary education. One possible explanation for this is that as a large 
body of new students entered the school system, classrooms and teachers 
initially assigned to higher grades were reassigned to CP1 to accommo-
date the new students. This is supported by the evolution of student to 
classroom ratios which increased between 2000 and 2010 from 40 to 53 
for students in grade 2—is expected as this is the cohort with additional 
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Fig. 2.6 School drop out by gender and grade in 2016/2017 (Source 
Government of Togo, National Yearbook of School Statistics, 2016/2017)
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free education students, but also increased for students in grade 5: from 
37 to 52 students per classroom. Another, complementary explanation is 
that the economic and political crisis left its mark on the quality of edu-
cation in Togo’s primary schools, reducing learning across the board.
Learning wise, the education system appears not to have recovered from 
the shock and in 2014 student PASEC scores are more or less comparable 
with those from 2010. They are worse for students in grade 2 for which 
the fraction of students that performs satisfactory dropped even further, 
and compare (math) or worse (French) for students in grade 5 (Fig. 2.7).
2.4  is togo A speciAl cAse?
The experience of Togo is illustrative for what happened elsewhere in 
low income sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. countries with per capita incomes 
of less $1000). Like Togo, most countries substantially increased pri-
mary school enrollment. For the 24 low-income countries in the region, 
net enrollment went up from 55% in 2000 to 76% in 2016 (Togo went 
from 51 to 89%). Despite the increase in enrollment, inequities continue 
to exist in Togo, by gender (90% male; 87% female), by location (96% 
urban; 85% rural) and particularly by wealth class (80% poorest quintile; 
97% wealthiest quintile). These patterns are not dissimilar to those found 
elsewhere in the region.
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Also, with respect to the outcomes on the learning tests does Togo not 
stand out relative to comparators in francophone Africa. Looking across 
PASEC test results for francophone countries one notes that Togo per-
forms better than some (Chad and Niger in particular) and worse than 
others (Senegal, Burundi, Burkina Faso). Togo does worse in French than 
most francophone countries, and better in maths. In fact, Togo performs 
pretty much around the average score which is 42.7 for French and 41.0 
for maths. Like other countries the problem of low learning achievement 
emerges in the early grades (Bashir et al. 2018) (Fig. 2.8).
2.5  conclusion to the chApter
Viewed from one perspective, Togo’s education system has been remark-
ably successful. During the economic and political crisis that affected 
the country between the mid-1990s and early 2000s, Togolese par-
ents continued to make sure their children enrolled in primary schools, 
often opting for private education or resorting to community initia-
tives. Following the crisis, the public system recovered and navigated 
successfully the stresses associated with the abolishment of school fees. 
Its introduction starting in the 2008/2009 school year led to a rapid 
expansion of the primary school system, which was aptly managed. 
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Fig. 2.8 Percent in grade 6 performing satisfactory on PASEC learning test 
(Source PASEC Country Report for Togo, 2014)
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Student–teacher and student–classroom ratios increased, but only tem-
porarily as more teachers were recruited and more classrooms con-
structed. Pass rates improved and the system managed to enhance its 
internal efficiency, reducing the fraction of students that do not pass 
from one grade to the next and limiting school drop out. As many more 
students started attending school, many—though not all, of the dispari-
ties between regions, rural and urban areas, by gender and wealth cate-
gories disappeared.
Free primary education did not come without cost and the Togolese 
authorities allocated substantial budgetary resources to primary edu-
cation, in fact more than doubling the percent of GDP spent on pri-
mary education. Also spending per pupil increased considerably. These 
achievements demonstrate the commitment of Togolese parents and 
authorities to education.
Yet there is another perspective. Expanding access, improving attend-
ance, enhancing efficiency and providing budgetary resources alone, is 
not sufficient to guarantee success. Too many children continue to drop 
out of school, implying individual drama and resource wastage. More 
importantly, evidence from learning tests suggests that the majority of pri-
mary school leavers do not master core competencies in reading, writing, 
and arithmetic. The results are suggestive of a profound learning crisis.
So it happened that the number of students in the public primary 
school system doubled from 570,000 in 2000 to over a million in 2014, 
and that the number of students who completed primary school went up 
from 100,000 in 2000 to around 200,000 in 2014. Yet, though budg-
ets more than doubled (expressed in real terms they went up by a factor 
2.35), the number of students who left primary school performing satis-
factory in French increased only from 71,000 in 2000 to about 95,000 in 
2014. The number of students performing satisfactory in math increased 
less, from about 60,000 in 2000 to 77,000 in 2014. Expressed this way, 
the enormous increase in spending appears to have achieved little.
Both school attendance and learning while at school are needed to 
assure that money invested in education yields a decent return. It is not 
the case now, which raises the question what could be done to rectify the 
situation. This question is explored in the remainder of this book.
Annex
See Table 2.4.
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Abstract  This chapter uses the annual school census to analyze 
 differences in primary school performances across regions. Our results, 
obtained from a stochastic frontier analysis, suggest that differences in 
efficiency explain only part of the observed variation, while resource 
availability is the most important driver of performance differences. In 
addition to this, we note that resources are distributed quite unevenly 
among regions and schools. By distributing more school inputs, or dis-
tributing existing inputs more equally to the benefit of underserved 
schools, performance can be expected to go up.
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3.1  introduction And motivAtion
As highlighted in the second chapter, Togo undeniably achieved 
improvements in the enrollment of primary school children. Through 
the combined effect of the introduction of free primary education and 
the absorption of community schools in the public school system, the 
number of students enrolled in public primary schools increased from 
less than 600,000 in 2006/2007 to about one million five years later. 
Over the same period the number of public schools increased from 3783 
to 4593 and the number of classrooms from 16,538 to 23,615.
Despite the progress made, learning assessments like those done by 
PASEC suggest the primary education system faces important chal-
lenges in terms of education quality, with respect to regional differences  
in attendance (much lower in Savanes for instance) and the distribution 
of school inputs. This chapter aims at understanding the role school 
inputs play as drivers of school performance. It does so by carrying 
out a frontier analysis. School performance data have been drawn from 
administrative data on learning assessments. Specifically, we use pri-
mary school pass rates for every primary school in the country, for the 
2010/2011 academic year.1 These data are then combined with infor-
mation on inputs, equally obtained for every school for the same school 
year. The first part of the analysis examines whether input quantities, ver-
sus inefficiency in input usage, explain differences in school outcomes. 
The analysis is then enriched by considering nonschool aspects, and 
uses Questionnaire des Indicateurs de Base du Bien-être (QUIBB) survey 
household data to assess drivers of enrollment within households.
The main contribution of this chapter is that it offers additional 
empirical evidence to organize the debate about resource vs. inefficiency 
in educational systems. Scholars have often pointed to teacher absentee-
ism as a main source of inefficiency and a main cause behind the dis-
mal learning outcomes in some low- and middle-income countries. For 
instance, Ravallion (2016) highlighted the extremely low levels of actual 
teaching in India (Probe Team 1999, 2011) as well as in several other 
1 The analysis in this chapter focuses on the 2010/2011 school year as this is the year for 
which complete dataset for all schools could be obtained. Since that time investments have 
been made to improve the availability of school inputs, as evidenced in the previous chap-
ter. Still as Chapter 2 demonstrates many schools and regions remain underserved, so that 
the assessment of this chapter remains relevant.
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countries (World Bank 2004). Teacher absenteeism has also been dis-
cussed, among the others, by Kremer et al. (2005), Banerjee and Duflo 
(2006), Chaudhury et al. (2006), and Duflo et al. (2012). As a result, 
many researchers have focused their effort to analyze how to provide 
stronger incentives to teachers (Glewwe et al. 2010). Similarly, school 
and teacher autonomy have been extensively discussed in Woessmann 
(2003), Fuchs and Woessmann (2007), and Hanushek et al. (2013).
This chapter finds that, while it is true that inefficiencies are wide-
spread and substantial, school resources are key determinants of 
educational outcomes. In other words, while it is true that reducing inef-
ficiency may improve student performance, it is important not to forget 
that much basic infrastructure is simply lacking. This result is in line with 
the role of school inputs emphasized in Angrist and Lavy (1999), Case 
and Deaton (1999), and Krueger (1999). The evidence from our analy-
sis of the school census suggests that gains brought about by increasing 
efficiency may be marginal compared to the huge potential benefits of 
additional school inputs. Students cannot learn without textbooks, black-
boards and toilets.
3.2  scholAstic inputs, eFFiciency And perFormAnce
By the 2010/2011 school year the primary cycle was in the midst of 
recovering from the combined shock of Togo’s the economic and cri-
sis which had lasted almost a decade and a half, the introduction of free 
universal education in 2008/2009 and the absorption of locally funded 
schools EDIL schools into the public system. Consequently, the frac-
tion of children attending public schools has increased from 58% in 
2006/2007 to 72% in 2011/2012 and total enrollment in public pri-
mary schools has gone up from around 600,000 in 2006/2007 to over 
1,000,000 students in 2011/2012, an increase by 66% (Fig. 3.1).
Despite this increase in enrollment, primary school enrollment 
remains far from universal. According to the 2011 QUIBB, only about 
82% of eligible children attend a primary school. Among children aged 
6–11 who do not attend primary school, those from the poorest house-
holds are over-represented: 38% of children who do not go to school 
come from the poorest households, whereas only 6% come from a house-
hold in the top wealth quintile.
Another challenge facing the school system in 2010/2011 was the 
presence of large regional inequalities in almost every aspect and at 
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almost every level. The further north one goes, the worse the results 
are. The Savanes region, in the upper north of the country is often the 
worst off, while the coastal regions Golfe-Lomé and Maritime are typi-
cally the best off. This gap can be illustrated with school access: the aver-
age enrollment rate in Togo is 82%, but this rate increases up to 87% in 
the coastal regions, whereas in Savanes it is only 72%. Almost a third of 
the children aged 6–11 who are not enrolled in a primary school can 
be found in Savanes, even though only 12% of the Togolese population 
resides there (Fig. 3.2).
Enrollment by school type Wealth of households for those (6-11) who 
are not enrolled 
590,114 
980,863 
305,725 
367,643 1,021,617
1,368,074
 -
 200,000
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 600,000
 800,000
 1,000,000
 1,200,000
 1,400,000
 1,600,000
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Poorest quintile 2nd 3rd 4th Wealthiest quintile
Fig. 3.1 Primary school enrollment inequalities (Source Authors’ calculations 
based on the Ministry of Education 2010/2011 EMIS Data Base and QUIBB 
2011)
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Fig. 3.2 Primary school enrollment (Source Authors’ calculations based on 
QUIBB 2011)
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As shown in Fig. 3.3, these stark gaps are reflected in differences in 
scholastic inputs. The number of students per teacher varies from around 
40 in Kara to over 55 in Golfe-Lomé and Savanes. In Plateaux the 
average number of students per classroom is 40; in Golfe-Lomé is 53. 
In Savanes, only 60% of students sit at a desk; in Golfe-Lomé, 85% of 
students do so. In Plateaux, only 21% of schools have access to water; 
in Golfe-Lomé and Central, about half the schools have such access. In 
terms of spending, the differences are equally striking. Salary spending 
Students per teacher Students per classroom
Students with a place to sit Schools with access to water
Salary spending per student Investment spending per student
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Fig. 3.3 School characteristics: 2010–2011 (Source Authors’ calculations based 
on Ministry of Education 2010/2011 EMIS Data Base)
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per student (taking into account differences in payments for different 
type of staff) in Savanes is 60% of that in Kara. The same holds for the 
total amount spent on investments. Considering the total outlays for 
buildings, toilets, desks and chairs, spending per student in Savanes is 
around CFAF 116,000, while for students in Kara 60% more had been 
spent CFAF 183,000.
At the prefecture, or at the school level, inequalities are even more 
pronounced. This can be illustrated with the number of students per 
classroom. At the national level, the average for public schools is 43 stu-
dents per class, but at the regional level this varies from 39 to 53 stu-
dents per class. At the prefecture level, the range goes from as low as 16 
students per class to as much as 103. It is hard to imagine that this kind 
of variability is an efficient way of allocating resources. Cantons where 
the number of students is only 16 per classroom have too many class-
rooms (or too few students). Cantons with more than a hundred stu-
dents per classroom may have so many students in a classroom that it 
becomes plausible that very little learning takes place, implying that most 
education spending may be wasted.
Another way to demonstrate the relation between adequate scho-
lastic inputs, efficiency and performance is by exploring the relation 
between outcomes and spending. The performance measure that we 
have selected is the number of students that were admitted to participate 
in the primary school leaving exam (not all students in CM2, the last 
grade in primary school, are allowed to participate in the exam) over the 
total number of students in the school. Children that pass the Certificat 
d’études du premier degré (CEPD) exam are allowed to proceed to sec-
ondary school. We prefer this measure over a more direct measure (such 
as the fraction of students that have passed the exam) because there is 
a reason to suspect that schools and students behave strategically with 
respect to who takes and passes the exam.
This defined, one notes the existence of large differences in our per-
formance measure (Fig. 3.4). Some cantons like Kozah in the Kara 
region, and Grande Lomé (GL) do well with respectively 12 and 11% of 
students admitted to the final exam. Others do poorly, such as Akebou in 
Plateaux of Kpendjal and Oti in the Savanes regions whose performance 
ratios are only a third of those of the aforementioned cantons (4%). 
Cantons in the northern region (Savanes) do particularly poorly. Beyond 
the fact that Centrale and Kara do better than Plateaux, with Maritime in 
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an intermediate position, the most striking about the figure is the large 
degree of intra-regional variation.
On the spending side, we calculate the annual spending on teacher 
salaries per student, taking into account differences in grade and levels of 
teacher pay.2 As spending on teachers makes up about 84% of the total 
primary education budget, it is a good proxy for total spending.
Figure 3.5 shows once again striking differences among regions. 
Indeed, if we look at payment grades for civil servants, the majority of 
teachers in Lomé are in grade C, while in all the other except Savanes 
they are mainly in grade B.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the relation between outcomes and expenditure. 
The graph presents for all public schools a measure of school perfor-
mance (on the vertical axis) and a measure of spending (on the horizon-
tal axis). Each dot in Fig. 3.6 represents a public school. The figure can 
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Fig. 3.4 School performance by canton in 2010/2011 (Note School perfor-
mance is defined as the number of students that have been admitted to partic-
ipating in the primary school leaving exam over the total number of students 
in the school. Source Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Education 
2011/2012 EMIS Data Base)
2 Voluntary teacher receives about CFAF 90,000 per annum whereas a civil servant 
receives almost 2 million and an assistant teacher 1.3 million.
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now be used to identify those schools that do particularly well: these are 
the schools with the best performance for a given level of spending.
The line in Fig. 3.6 presents local averages. This line is upward slop-
ing suggesting that more inputs (or more spending per student) lead to 
better results. This plot emphasizes that certain schools perform poorly 
given the resources they receive (those below the line do worse than 
0%
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40%
50%
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70%
Centrale Golfe
Lome
Kara Maritime Plateaux Savanes Togo
average
Grade A1 / A2 Grade B Grade C Grade D
Fig. 3.5 Distribution of teachers of different grade levels by region (Source 
Government of Togo, National Yearbook of School Statistics, 2010/2011)
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only) (Source Authors’ calculations)
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average), while others (those above the line) do better than average. 
Excellent are those schools that lie furthest above the regression line.
This figure can also be used to demonstrate, despite not making 
any causality claims, that within the universe of schools in Togo there 
is scope for efficiency improvements through efficiency gains. Some 
schools receiving CFAF 20,000 per student do extremely poorly and 
have a performance ratio of around zero, whereas others have perfor-
mance ratios higher than 0.1. By bringing the schools up to at least the 
average (of about 0.9) significant advances can be made without incur-
ring additional spending.
The discussion so far has only illustrated that both inputs and effi-
ciency matter for performance. Which of these factors matter most, and 
which inputs are more important, cannot be inferred from these descrip-
tive statistics. To deepen our study, we need to turn to regression analy-
sis, which is presented in the remainder of the chapter.
3.3  dAtA
The main datasets used in the regression analysis are Primary School 
Census data, particularly those for the 2010/2011 academic year. This 
dataset comprises detailed information for each school for a total of 6158 
observations. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of the schools across 
regions: the relative majority (around 25%) is located in the Plateaux 
region, while the region with the smallest number of schools is Savanes. 
Our analysis is centered on the ratio of admitted students to the final 
exam of primary school (CEPD) over the total number of students in 
Table 3.1 Number of 
schools by region
Source Ministry of Education 2010/2011 EMIS Data Base
Initial data Sample data
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Centrale 761 12.36 492 11.26
Golfe-Lomé 992 16.11 672 15.38
Kara 882 14.32 699 16.00
Maritime 1187 19.28 820 18.77
Plateaux 1595 25.90 1143 26.17
Savanes 741 12.03 542 12.41
Total 6158 100 4368 100
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the school. To construct this variable, we merged the 2010/2011 and 
2011/2012 school census data, since in the 2010/2011 census infor-
mation about admissions to the exam was not present. Indeed, the exam 
results are reported in the school census the following year.
The school census data sets only present school information, but in 
our regression we also want to include nonschool variables as controls, 
such as the level of education of the population living in proximity of the 
school in a region. Such information is available from the poverty map 
that was constructed by combining the population census (Quatrième 
Recensement Général de la Population et de l’Habitat, RGPH4) of 2009 
and the household survey QUIBB of 2011. It was not possible to match 
school level information to census or poverty map information, but 
at the canton level this was possible. But even then, it was not always 
possible to obtain a correct match and some observations were lost in 
this process. For instance, some schools were dropped because the total 
number of students admitted to CEPD was bigger than the total number 
of students in CM2. As a result, the number of observations used in the 
estimations is reduced to 4368. The last two columns of Table 3.1 dis-
play the final data, which are used in the analysis.
An overview of the main variables used in the regression can be found 
in the Appendix. Here we consider some of them, which are correlated 
to our main variable of interest: the percent of students admitted to 
the CEPD over the total number of students in the school. Figure 3.7 
Admitted CEPD over total students in the school
By type of school
Admitted CEPD over total students in the school
By region
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Fig. 3.7 Performance by school type and by region (Note Schools whose pass 
rate was equal to 0 have been dropped. Source Authors’ calculations based on 
Ministry of Education 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 EMIS Data Base)
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shows how schools performed on average by school type (Public, 
EDIL, Catholic, Islamic, Protestant and Laic) and by region. The fig-
ure shows that the best performing schools are private schools and that 
Kara, Lomé and Centrale are the regions with the highest levels of per-
formance. It is also interesting to note the gender dimension of school 
performances, which suggests that in all regions and across all school 
types boys perform better than girls: this in contrast to what is gener-
ally found in non-developing countries. The difference in performance is 
least pronounced in Laic schools and in Lomé, and most pronounced in 
Community and Islamic schools.
Figure 3.8 provides further information about the gender issue: the 
ratio between girls in CP1, the first year of primary school and total 
number of students in CP1 does not differ substantially between urban 
and rural areas. Nevertheless, while this ratio remains roughly stable for 
higher educational levels in cities, there is a steady decline of female stu-
dents across classes in the countryside. Indeed, in CP1 the ratio is 47.9% 
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Fig. 3.8 Ratio of female over male students by grade in rural and urban 
areas (Note Male students are the complement to one of female student. 
Source Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Education 2010/2011 and 
2011/2012 EMIS Data Base)
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(49.6% in urban areas), whereas in the last year of primary school CM2 is 
38.9% (48.6% in urban areas).
3.4  estimAtion results
Table 3.2 contains the main regression result using a stochastic frontier 
technique.3
We first present our basic specification (column 1) and a richer speci-
fication in column (2). It is worth mentioning that the dependent varia-
ble is the ratio—not the percentage—of students admitted to the CEPD 
over the total number of students in the school. This explains why, at 
first sight, the coefficients in Table 3.2 have small magnitude.
Although the main aim of this chapter is to measure school ineffi-
ciency, i.e. to analyze the residuals from the frontier analysis, it is inter-
esting to look at some of the regressors. However, it should be stressed 
that we cannot attach a causal interpretation to such coefficients. One 
of the main results is that private school show better results. This is in 
line with Pereira and Moreira (2007). Nevertheless, private schools are 
likely to be more expensive, so we should not infer from this that pri-
vate schools use their resources in a more efficient way. In fact, if private 
schools paid their teachers better, one would expect these schools to per-
form better. In the absence of information on the actual cost of schools, 
the best we can do is to just illustrate by using a dummy variable the 
differences between private and public schools and note that a cost-ben-
efit analysis would be a very useful contribution of future work. It is also 
worth noting that the regressions are not able to control neither for fam-
ily background nor for knowledge of children at school start (i.e. kinder-
garten attendance). Hence, the magnitude of the private school variable 
3 The frontier technique is defined as follows: yi= f(xi, ß) + vi−ui, here, yi is the output 
of school i, our measure of performance, f(.) is a measurable production function, xi are 
exogenous variables, ß is a vector of unknown parameters and vi−ui is the composed error 
term consisting of v, the symmetric disturbance (idiosyncratic effect), and u, the non-nega-
tive disturbance measuring the inefficiency of the school (productive inefficiency). The ran-
dom errors vi are usually assumed to be independently and identically distributed N
(
0; σ
2
v
)
, 
and independent from the ui. The most common assumption for the inefficiency term is 
the half-normal distribution (Aigner et al. 1977), i.e. the non-negative truncation of the 
N
(
0; σ
2
u
)
. We use the Stata command frontier to perform the analysis, with the default half 
normal distribution in the model. We also performed the analysis by using a Tobit analysis 
and we also excluded thee top 255. However, the results have not changed substantially.
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Table 3.2 Frontier analysis for ratio of admitted CEPD students over total stu-
dents in school
(1) (2)
Private school (d) 0.014015*** 0.021946***
(0.0013) (0.0044)
Number of teachers in the school −0.001223** −0.000426
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Teachers-students ratio 0.002554*** 0.001466**
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Female ratio in CM2 0.026710*** 0.022680***
(0.0034) (0.0033)
Average student age in CM2 −0.001066* −0.000656
(0.0005) (0.0005)
CP1–CP2 taught together (d) 0.005535*** 0.004637**
(0.0016) (0.0015)
CE1–CE2 taught together −0.001050 0.000501
(0.0016) (0.0015)
CM1–CM2 taught together (d) −0.027240*** −0.022625***
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Employment ratio −0.000615*** −0.000162*
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Net enrollment rate—primary 0.000054 0.000358***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Urban (d) 0.006201*** 0.007130***
(0.0013) (0.0014)
Average qualification teachers in private school −0.004470*
(0.0018)
Ratio of permanent teachers −0.008761***
(0.0021)
Repeating students rate −0.056092***
(0.0044)
Ln Average teacher age 0.016199***
(0.0042)
Gender Headmaster (d) 0.008066***
(0.0018)
Average qualification teachers 0.002982**
(0.0009)
Seats every 100 students −0.000041
(0.0000)
Desks every 100 students 0.000284***
(0.0000)
Toilets every 100 student 0.001490***
(0.0004)
(continued)
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is likely to be affected by endogeneity issues, as it is likely that students 
from high socio-economic status self-select into private schools.
The results show that additional teachers are associated with increas-
ing performance. On average, the pass rate is between 0.14 and 0.25 
percentage points higher in schools with an additional teacher per every 
hundred students.
We now turn to the gender composition of the class. Given the high 
drop-out rate of females, we expect that a higher female to male ratio 
could lead to an average improvement, if the girls in school are a selected 
sample and are better than average students. The coefficient of female 
students over total students in CM2 is positive and strongly signif-
icant, thus implying also a substantial peer effect: the more numerous 
are the girls with respect to boys in the class, the higher is the school 
performance.
Older students in class do have a detrimental effect on the overall per-
formance, but this effect holds in the most parsimonious specification 
only. Similarly, schools regularly merge classes, so it is important to see 
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 3.2 (continued)
(1) (2)
Water in school −0.000092
(0.0011)
Math books per students 0.003174
(0.0023)
Reading books per students 0.002538
(0.0018)
Dependency ratio 0.001847***
(0.0001)
Enrollment rate (secondary school) 0.000363***
(0.0001)
Constant 0.127766*** −0.112837***
lnsig2v −6.889271*** −7.068340***
(0.0214) (0.0225)
lnsig2u −16.88815 −17.02233
(108.2370) (63.9037)
Lambda .006748 .006908
Observations 4368 3957
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the effect of such a policy. Unexpectedly, if the first two years (CP1–
CP2) are taught together, the effect is positive and significant. This 
result might signal an imitation effect that at young age, it could be ben-
eficial for all children (in a similar vein with kindergarten). Conversely, 
the effect is strongly negative and significant for the last two grades 
(CM1–CM2), thus suggesting that classes with more than one advanced 
course taught simultaneously might have detrimental effects on learning. 
This result is very robust and corroborates the hypothesis that the learn-
ing environment is something policy-makers should focus on. Indeed, 
the magnitude of the last coefficient is rather high: teaching CM1–CM2 
together are associated with a reduction of more than 2 percentage 
points in the outcome.
Employment rate in the canton in which the school is located acts as 
detrimental to performance, possibly because it acts as a proxy for the 
fact that parents have fewer opportunities to spend time with their chil-
dren after school. From a geographical point of view, urban schools per-
form better than rural ones on average.
In the richer specification, we include additional variables, which 
could impact the outcome of interest. Considering the qualification of 
teachers, the effect is strongly significant and positive. Qualification of 
teachers in private schools, in contrast, gives approximately no impact, 
if anything. The ratio of repeating students is negatively related with the 
pass rate, as expected. Teacher experience (approximated by age) has a 
strong correlation with school performance. Furthermore, if the school 
headmaster is a woman, resources seem to be used more efficiently: cet-
eris paribus, a female headmaster is associated with an increase of around 
one percentage point in the pass rate.
We also add among the regressors the ratio of permanent teachers 
out of total teachers. One might expect that the number of permanent 
teachers could positively affect the overall performance. Indeed, through 
a selection effect, the permanent teachers should be more likely to be bet-
ter teachers within an efficient recruitment system. However, the results 
work towards an opposite direction: the higher the ratio of permanent 
teachers, the lower is the school performance. We thus infer that increas-
ing teacher quality is not correlated with hiring more permanent teachers.
In addition to this, the characteristics of the school premises do 
matter: desk number significantly affects the frontier as the quality of 
infrastructure shows an important role. The more desks are available, 
the higher the performance. The availability of desks has an enormous 
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importance and, remarkably, toilets as well. An additional toilet for every 
hundred students has the same impact of an additional teacher. Possibly, 
this result could reflect better hygienic conditions, which, in turn, would 
turn into better health and higher performance.
We now turn our attention to the most important element of this 
analysis. The estimate of  is reported at the end of Table 3.2. This 
parameter is defined as
and it is not statistically different from zero. When  goes close to +∞, 
then all variation from the frontier is due to the inefficiency term, then it 
should be better to use the deterministic approach to estimate such fron-
tier. On the other hand, if  is close to 0—as in our case—a stochastic 
frontier is a more appropriate choice.
A critical result of our analysis is the low variability in the inefficiency 
term ui. This implies that it is possible to distinguish between more and 
less efficient schools, but the key factor explaining differences in perfor-
mance is the presence of inputs (and the noise component of the error 
term). In other words, differences in the pass rate are due mainly to lack 
of resources rather than technical inefficiency. We want to stress this 
result as it is crucial for the policy standpoint. Resources are distributed 
unevenly among regions and schools, and their distribution is the main 
driver of differences in results.
In Table 3.3, we present predicted performance by quintile of perfor-
mance and the region in which the school is located. The schools requir-
ing most attention i.e. the worst performing schools, are concentrated in 
Plateaux and Savanes, while few poorly performing schools are found in 
 =
σu
σv
Table 3.3 Predicted school performance, by quintile and region
Quintile Centrale Lomé Kara Maritime Plateaux Savanes Total
Worst performing 4.7 0.3 12.5 17.8 42.5 22.3 100
2 9.1 9.8 16.3 16.2 30.5 18.1 100
3 11.1 17.3 13.0 21.0 27.3 10.1 100
4 16.6 22.7 14.1 15.16 22.2 9.5 100
Best performing 15.7 24.4 31.0 8.0 14.1 6.8 100
Total 11.4 14.9 17.4 15.6 27.3 13.4 100
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Lomé and Centrale. The second best performers show a percentage of 
10% in Savanes and the highest in Golfe-Lomé and Plateaux. Targeting 
poorest performing school does not mean targeting a region in particu-
lar, at least with the exception of Golfe-Lomé, where the percentage of 
worst performing school is negligible.
One possible concern with our empirical strategy is that individu-
als may move in order to gain access to a better school. First of all, 
it should be noted that Togo is a low-income country, thus there are 
high information asymmetries and parents may not know enough to 
judge the quality of a school. Second, in order to address this potential 
issue, we have looked at the data available from MICS 2010, a repre-
sentative survey of the population in Togo. If parents did send their 
children to other family members in order to give them the oppor-
tunity to attend high-quality schools, we would observe these move-
ments in the household composition. However, if we consider only 
household members aged between 5 and 12 who attended school in 
the academic year 2010/2011, the vast majority (almost 80%) was 
the household head’s child. Furthermore, once we exclude orphans 
and children whose parents lived in the same households even if they 
were not the household head, we are left with 10% of children, which 
may have moved to a different household because of school quality. 
Nevertheless, this is a (relatively small) upper bound since parents may 
also send their children to their relatives because they have to work or 
they do not have the money to feed and raise them. It is thus plau-
sible that economic reasons were pivotal among poorer households. 
Keeping this into account, only 3.6% of all the children in the relevant 
age group attending school were sent to relatives who belonged to the 
top two wealth quintiles.
A similar kind of student selection may occur if the whole house-
hold moved to a neighborhood with higher-quality school. Although 
this is usual in developed countries such as the United States, it seems 
unlikely in this context given the tight budget constraint. Indeed, as 
discussed in IMF (2014), migration in Togo is mainly driven by eco-
nomic rather than educational opportunities. Thus, given the above 
discussion, we can conclude that sample selection due to student 
mobility was extremely limited and should not affect the validity of our 
results.
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3.5  the demAnd side: determinAnts oF school 
enrollment
This section focuses on the demand side: we look at the drivers behind 
a child enrollment status and examine it as a household decision. We do 
so by making use of QUIBB for the determinants of school enrollment 
and achievements. More in detail, as for the determinants of the school 
demand, we have mainly relied on the two waves of QUIBB, i.e. 2006 
and 2011. This survey contains 7500 households who were interviewed 
in Togo during the first wave, including 36,430 individuals, whereas 
5532 households and 29,781 individuals took part in the second wave. 
This repeated cross-section is extremely useful for the purpose of our 
research since it provides several information on household composition, 
education3, health, employment, assets, current expenditure, auto-con-
sumption and income.
Table 3.4 shows the results about the determinants of school enroll-
ment. The dependent variable is a dummy which is equal to 1 if the 
respondent was attending school at the time of the interview. Therefore, 
since this enrollment decision is represented by an indicator variable, it 
has been necessary to use a binary choice model, i.e. a Probit model. 
Only individuals aged between 6 and 15 years have been considered. The 
main dataset used in this analysis has been QUIBB 2006 and 2011, thus 
it has been possible to examine two time periods.
Column 1 in Table 3.4 contains a basic specification (17,968 observa-
tions), while Columns 2 and 3 show an extended model computed used 
Probit and Logit estimation methods respectively. Furthermore, in the 
last two columns the sample have been splitted: the same probit regres-
sion of Column 2 has been run for individuals aged 6–8 (Column 5) and 
9–15 (Column 6). Marginal effects instead of coefficients are shown in 
all models displayed in Table 3.4.
First of all, it is interesting to note how household composition 
affects the variable of interest: if there are small children (aged 0–4), the 
respondents are less likely to go to school, especially for older individ-
uals (age 9–15, Column 6). This is probably due to the fact that older 
children are expected to take care of their younger siblings while their 
parents work. In a specular way, a higher number of adults in the house-
hold increases the probability of going to school: this effect is statistically 
significant for individuals aged 9–15, but not for those aged 6–8.
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The maximum education level of the household head (or of the 
spouse if higher) have a positive and significant effect in all specifications. 
In line with this finding, Column 4 shows the effects of mother’s and 
father’s education4 on their offsprings’5: both variables have a positive 
and significant effect, and mother’s education has a bigger impact than 
father’s. Another relevant variable is the distance from primary school6: 
the effect is negative and strongly significant in all specifications.
If the household head is a woman, children are more likely to go to 
school (Column 2). The coefficient is statistically significant. Moreover, 
if parents are alive and live in the same household, the enrollment prob-
ability increases for individuals aged 6–15 and 9–15—and the effect is 
bigger for the mother rather than the father—whereas it is not significant 
for respondent aged 6–8. In addition to this, children who live in house-
holds producing part of the goods consumed by the members themselves 
are less likely to attend school, especially if aged between 6 and 8, proba-
bly because they are involved in the production process.
Quite surprisingly, neither the natural logarithm of total consumption 
per capita nor the gender indicator has some significant effect. On the 
other hand, the interaction between these two variables is negative and 
significant (albeit it is no longer significant when only people aged 6–8 
are considered). The actual and potential impact of ICT on the educa-
tion process is stressed by the positive and significant effect of mobile 
phones: the dummy signaling whether the household owns a mobile 
phone has a positive and significant coefficient both for children aged 
6–15 and 9–15.
In line with the descriptive statistics, the improvements observed 
between 2006 and 2011 are reflected in the positive and significant coef-
ficient of the time dummy. Finally, from a geographical point of view, 
Savanna seems the region where children are less likely to go to school, 
whereas Coastal Region have a positive and significant coefficient in 
4 Therefore, the variable “Max education in the household (head vs. spouse)” have been 
dropped.
5 Since only natural sons and daughters have been included in this regression, the variable 
“No son nor daughter” have been omitted.
6 Distances are reported as 15 min intervals. In other words, the variable distance from 
primary school takes value 1 if the respondent spent up to 14 minutes to go to school, 2 if 
the time was between 15 and 29 minutes, 3 between 30 and 44, 4 between 45 and 60, 5 if 
the student had to travel more than an hour to reach her primary school.
50  J. HOOGEVEEN ET AL.
Column 2 (age 6–15), as well as in Column 6 (age 9–15), whereas the 
estimated relation is negative and significant in Column 5 (age 6–8). 
Central Region has a positive and significant coefficient both in Columns 
2 and 6 (Lomé has been taken as a reference point in order to avoid per-
fect multicollinearity).
In the first two columns of Table 3.5, the same model as in Table 3.4 
(Column 2) has been estimated while distinguishing between waves. The 
remarkable improvements achieved during that period are highlighted 
by the weaker coefficients of the regional dummies in 2011 than 2006. 
Indeed, only the marginal effect of Coastal remained still significant in 
wave 2, thus regional differences had almost disappeared between 2006 
and 2011. Moreover, the self-production dummy—which is equal to 1 if 
the household produced (part of) the goods which consumed—was no 
longer significant in 2011: this may be interpreted as a good signal since 
more children enrolled in school in 2011 instead of working within the 
household.
The last column of Table 3.5 includes the natural logarithm of public 
expenditure on primary school per student and the total number of stu-
dents in primary schools in 2011. In this specification it was not possible 
to include all regional dummies, otherwise there would have been perfect 
collinearity. Therefore, only two dummies for Gulf Lomé and Savanna 
have been added. Contrary to what was expected, the coefficient of public 
expenditure is significant and negative.
In order to deepen our analysis, we have considered not only whether 
individuals were attending school at the time of the interview, but also 
the highest educational level achieved by individuals between age 6 
and 15. To do so, Table 3.6 takes as dependent variable the respond-
ent’s years of education. In order to avoid a selection bias, we have used 
the Heckman estimation method: the selection variable is a dummy 
which indicates whether the individual had ever been to school. As 
reported at the end of the table, the arthrho is statistically different from 
0, therefore taking into account such selection bias seems the appropriate 
procedure.
Similarly to the findings of the probit analysis, if there are babies in 
the households aged 0–4 years, there is a negative and significant effect 
on educational achievements, while the number of adults, as well as the 
number of children (which was not significant previously), have positive 
and significant coefficients. Affiliation matters: not being the household 
head’s child does not affect the probability of attending school, as shown 
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Table 3.5 Enrollment probability (6–15)
(1) (2) (3)
Wave 1
2006
Wave 2
2011
Wave 2
2011
Ln (public expenditure per student) −0.021263*
(0.0104)
Number babies (0–4) −0.017364*** −0.013502*** −0.013567***
(0.0052) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Number children (5–15) 0.004497 −0.003336 −0.003596
(0.0032) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Number adults (>15) 0.006718* 0.007983*** 0.008550***
(0.0033) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Household head female (d) 0.089179*** 0.079338*** 0.079188***
(0.0150) (0.0101) (0.0101)
Max Education household (head vs. 
spouse)
0.020015*** 0.014812*** 0.014700***
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Mother alive (d) 0.060079*** 0.022886 0.022338
(0.0170) (0.0127) (0.0126)
Father alive (d) 0.042476 0.046604* 0.046728*
(0.0236) (0.0181) (0.0182)
Self-production (d) −0.069504*** −0.007687 −0.008930
(0.0154) (0.0129) (0.0128)
Ln (Total private expenditure per capita) 0.019910 0.001414 0.003484
(0.0123) (0.0086) (0.0087)
Interaction female expenditure pc −0.023518 −0.017503 −0.018331
(0.0147) (0.0106) (0.0107)
Female (d) 0.126068 0.095617 0.103128
(0.1336) (0.0988) (0.0995)
Neither son nor daughter (d) −0.009036 −0.004765 −0.004654
(0.0224) (0.0160) (0.0160)
Distance from primary school (time) −0.021042*** −0.021572*** −0.021070***
(0.0050) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Distance from secondary school (time) −0.011658** −0.013822*** −0.014354***
(0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Distance from health center (time) −0.010664* −0.007527* −0.007297*
(0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Distance from food market (time) 0.009067* 0.007603* 0.005984
(0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Distance from public transport (time) −0.018609*** −0.006433 −0.005588
(0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Household owns a mobile phone (d) 0.046768** 0.026563** 0.028335**
(0.0159) (0.0089) (0.0089)
Savanes (d) −0.101121*** −0.018133 −0.055660***
(continued)
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in the enrollment rates estimations, but it does negatively influence the 
investment in more advanced education.
Again, if the head of the household is female, or she has a high level 
of education, children are more likely to achieve higher educational lev-
els. Furthermore, if there is some form of self-production, or if the pri-
mary school is distant, the expected education acquired by children is 
lower. On the other hand, the improvements occurred over the last years 
are verified by the positive coefficient of the time dummy, while it should 
be stressed that regional differences are even higher in this model since 
all geographical dummies except Central have a negative and significant 
coefficient. Finally, in this case not only private expenditure per capita 
and the gender dummy are statistically insignificant, but even the interac-
tion between these two variables is no longer significant.
Table 3.5 (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
Wave 1
2006
Wave 2
2011
Wave 2
2011
(0.0273) (0.0239) (0.0120)
Lomé (d) −0.017324
(0.0251)
Maritime (d) 0.063014** 0.045119*
(0.0204) (0.0177)
Plateaux (d) −0.008878 0.006479
(0.0233) (0.0218)
Centrale (d) 0.077594*** 0.037633
(0.0201) (0.0193)
Kara (d) −0.012059 0.019745
(0.0246) (0.0208)
Observations 8782 8015 8015
Pseudo R-squared 0.147 0.126 0.125
Log likelihood −4110.46 −2999.21 −3003.69
Marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Data on public expenditure available only in 
2011. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Public expenditure includes expenditure 
on staff for preschool and primary education. Individuals aged 6–15 are asked if they currently go to 
school. Education level is in years of school. Distances are reported as 15 min intervals
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 3.6 School achievements (6–15). Heckman
(1) (2)
Year education Ever gone to school
Number babies (0–4) −0.319757*** −0.114584***
(0.0207) (0.0095)
Number children (5–15) 0.045969*** 0.011212*
(0.0125) (0.0056)
Number adults (>15) 0.155505*** 0.058240***
(0.0123) (0.0059)
Household head female (d) 0.508948*** 0.197370***
(0.0790) (0.0380)
Max education household (head vs. spouse) 0.120820*** 0.058441***
(0.0052) (0.0027)
Mother alive (d) −0.184388** −0.045599
(0.0681) (0.0326)
Father alive (d) −0.391237*** −0.158442***
(0.0917) (0.0443)
Self-production (d) −0.352352*** −0.188359***
(0.0644) (0.0351)
Ln (total private expenditure per capita) 0.042751 0.047041*
(0.0473) (0.0226)
Interaction female expenditure pc 0.049929 0.013097
(0.0609) (0.0290)
Female (d) −1.002680 −0.367056
(0.5717) (0.2700)
Neither son nor daughter (d) −0.843895*** −0.323552***
(0.0910) (0.0433)
Distance from primary school (time) −0.096577*** −0.053916***
(0.0235) (0.0103)
Distance from secondary school (time) −0.155219*** −0.059414***
(0.0191) (0.0089)
Distance from health center (time) −0.033446 −0.025955**
(0.0188) (0.0088)
Distance from food market (time) 0.070442*** 0.033122***
(0.0184) (0.0086)
Distance from public transport (time) −0.093921*** −0.044452***
(0.0183) (0.0083)
Household owns a mobile phone (d) 0.264920*** 0.112153***
(0.0550) (0.0272)
Wave 2—2011 (d) 0.475004*** 0.223110***
(0.0495) (0.0233)
Maritime (d) −0.245455** −0.123515*
(0.0856) (0.0509)
Plateaux (d) −0.266192** −0.161414**
(continued)
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3.6  conclusions
By 2010/2011 the public education system had made substantial 
improvements in enrollment. In fact, the percentage of children who had 
never gone to school has decreased sharply between 2006 and 2011 in 
all regions and across all wealth quintiles. Nevertheless, there remain sig-
nificant challenges in how to bring the remaining children into school, 
how to accommodate the large influx of new students, how to improve 
levels of learning and how to reduce regional inequalities.
The assessment of the decision drivers to send one’s children to 
school demonstrates that this decision is explained by a combination of 
household-specific variables and variables that can be affected through 
public policy. We find no evidence for the level of household expend-
iture mattering for school attendance and grade achievement, which is 
encouraging. Certain determinants fall largely outside the scope of public 
Table 3.6 (continued)
(1) (2)
Year education Ever gone to school
(0.0926) (0.0530)
Centrale (d) 0.004187 −0.009589
(0.0947) (0.0545)
Kara (d) −0.326618*** −0.189849***
(0.0966) (0.0545)
Savanes (d) −0.696105*** −0.332999***
(0.0978) (0.0545)
Constant 3.527651*** 1.049962***
(0.4816) (0.2307)
Athrho 2.845714***
(0.0366)
Ln(sigma) 0.920123***
(0.0062)
Observations 16,804
Log likelihood −3.6e + 04
Standard errors in parentheses. Lomé is taken as reference region. Individuals aged 6–15 are asked if 
they have ever been to school and their highest educational level. Education level is in years of school. 
Distances are reported as 15 min intervals
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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policy-making: household composition, or having a female household 
head. Other determinants can only be slowly affected by public pol-
icy, such as the level of education of one’s parents. Yet other variables 
suggest that public resource availability matters. Distance to school, for 
instance, is a significant driver of the decision to attend school.
By carrying out a stochastic frontier analysis, this chapter also looked 
into the school-level drivers of performance (defined by passing the 
CEPD exam) for those students who attend school. A key result is that 
differences in performance between schools are mainly attributable to a 
lack of resources and less to differences in technical efficiency. This is an 
important point, because this chapter has also noted that resources are 
distributed unevenly among regions and schools. By improving access 
to inputs, particularly in the underserved schools, performance can be 
expected to go up considerably.
The fact that inefficiency is a less important factor explaining differ-
ences in performance should not be taken to mean that there are no 
efficiency issues affecting primary schools in Togo. As the SDI survey 
(discussed in Chapter 4) will demonstrate, teachers only spend around 
50% of their time teaching. This is an important inefficiency, which needs 
to be addressed. What the regression analysis suggests is that these inef-
ficiencies affect all schools more or less equally, but also that they might 
be picked by our control variables. For instance, and we are speculat-
ing here, the reason why the presence of more permanent teachers has 
a negative impact on performance might be because once made perma-
nent, teachers are less motivated to show up and teach. The latter, how 
to motive teachers, is something to consider carefully, particularly if the 
Government of Togo is considering the possibility to hire additional per-
manent teachers.
The results also suggest the importance of paying more attention to 
the learning environment. The effects can be subtle and are, at times, 
surprising. Combining the first two classes of primary school has been 
found to have a positive relation with performance, but combining the 
last two classes not. Improving teacher quality may also have an impor-
tant impact on performance, but teacher quality (as expressed through 
experience or qualifications) is different from hiring permanent teachers. 
Finally, schools with higher repeating student rates perform worse, and 
schools that manage to retain more girls perform better.
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Appendix
See Table 3.7.
Table 3.7 Summary statistics
Variables Mean St. Dev
Number of teachers 5.36 1.86
Teacher students 2.69 1.05
Average qualification teachers*private 0.60 1.07
Private 0.26 0.44
Repeating students rate 0.22 0.12
Ln Average teacher age 3.64 0.13
Female headmaster 0.07 0.26
Female ratio in CM2 0.41 0.15
Average qualification teachers 2.42 0.62
Average student age in CM2 11.91 1.05
Seat every 100 students 82.18 38.65
Desk every 100 students 41.12 19.82
Toilet every 100 students 1.11 1.47
Water 0.35 0.48
Math-book per student 0.34 0.33
Read-book per student 0.49 0.42
CP1-2 taught together 0.22 0.41
CE1-2 taught together 0.35 0.48
CM1-2 taught together 0.45 0.50
Employment rate 70.53 8.72
Employment rate (w/o salary) 87.97 8.75
Dependency ratio 54.53 5.90
Enrollment primary 78.78 7.80
Enrollment secondary 37.04 14.60
Urban 0.26 0.44
Admitted CEPD/Tot students in the school 0.08 0.04
Observations 3957
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CHAPTER 4
Student Learning and Teacher Competence
Johannes Hoogeveen, Marcello Matranga  
and Mariacristina Rossi
Abstract  In this chapter, we analyze individual primary school children 
learning outcomes, using a unique dataset, the SDI dataset that com-
prises information about learning achievement for students, schools, 
and teachers. The novelty of the dataset is the collection of information 
from teachers, testing their knowledge in math, French, and non-verbal 
reasoning. Our results show that enrolling in a private school and liv-
ing in an urban area are associated with better learning outcomes, even 
when the characteristics of the schools and teachers are controlled for. 
The results also show a worryingly low level of competency for teachers. 
Overall, the results point to a deep learning crisis, so deep that serious 
public action is needed to address it: changes at the margin are unlikely 
to suffice.
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4.1  introduction to the chApter
Our goal is to investigate individual learning outcome drivers. This is 
carried out by using pupils’ test scores obtained from an independent 
learning assessment survey: the Survey and Delivery Indicators (SDI) 
survey. This is opposed to the way student performance was measured in 
the previous chapter, where we relied on the results of the end-of-school 
exam. The SDI dataset captures students and teachers’ knowledge data 
for students in grade four. The data suggests that while enrollment rates 
have reached unprecedented levels, suggesting enormous progress in 
human capital accumulation, the picture is less rosy than it may seem at 
first sight. Many students, it turns out, fail to acquire basic skills, despite 
attending school. Moreover, many teachers show skill deficiencies.
Key results are illustrated in Table 4.1, which presents summary sta-
tistics for public and private schools, with an additional breakdown 
between urban and rural public schools. Out of a maximum score of 
100, students score on average 45.1. Since the SDI test is a grade spe-
cific test, one would expect the vast majority of students to score highly, 
70–80% or higher—on average! So, these results point toward insuffi-
cient learning by pupils who attend primary school. The results hold for 
both French and mathematics and hold for both private and public insti-
tutions, with private schools doing better and rural public schools doing 
worse.
One of the unique features of the SDI approach is that teacher quali-
fications are also tested. Since pupils cannot learn more from their teach-
ers than what the teachers know, assessing teacher knowledge is evidently 
important. Worryingly the average score of teachers was not different 
than that from their students: 43.0. Among the teachers, only 2.7% 
scored 80% or higher. In rural public schools, even less than 1% managed 
to get a score of 80%. Evidently, teacher qualifications are an issue.
Other aspects of the learning environment are not encouraging either. 
Overall, 21.6% of teachers were not in school during an unannounced 
visit (a further 15% were at school, but not in the classroom). When in 
the classroom, teachers taught 79.2% of the time, meaning that nearly 
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Table 4.1 SDI key results
Source Adapted from Rockmore (2016). Togo Service Delivery Indicators: Education 2013
Togo Public Private Urban public Rural public
2013 2012 2014 2013 2014
Student learning outcomes
Combined math/language 
score
45.1 38.4 63.8 46.9 36.0
French score (%) 44.9 37.6 66.3 47.2 34.5
Math score (%) 43.9 41.0 52.1 43.1 40.4
Teacher knowledge
Minimum knowledge 2.7 1.4 4.8 4.5 0.8
Test score (out of 100) 43.0 40.6 48.6 46.5 39.4
Teacher effort
School absence rate  
(% teachers)
21.6 23.0 18.5 14.0 24.3
Classroom absence rate  
(% teachers)
37.2 38.9 33.3 25.3 41.5
Time spent teaching per 
day
2 h 40 m 2 h 38 m 2 h 44 m 3 h 13 m 2 h 33 m
Scheduled teaching time 
per day
5 h 29 m 5 h 28 m 5 h 33 m 5 h 28 m 5 h 28 m
Resource availability
Student–teacher ratio 
(observed)
29.1 31.0 24.8 33.5 27.5
Textbook availability  
(percent of students)
68.5 76.0 52.6 73.3 66.6
Teaching equipment  
availability (% classrooms)
26.4 24.3 30.8 9.4 27.5
Infrastructure availability 
(% of schools)
22.3 14.4 39.2 18.6 13.6
one‐fifth of the time was devoted to other activities. Cumulating the 
sources of lost teaching time, pupils have roughly 48.9% of the scheduled 
teaching time.
In Chapter 2 it was noted how the average student teacher ratio has 
remained constant at 42–1 since the introduction of free primary educa-
tion, suggesting that number of teachers increased to accommodate the 
massive entrance of new pupils since school fees were abolished.
It is not only teachers who are missing from school, so are students. 
Though the official student teacher ratio is 42–1, the student teacher 
62  J. HOOGEVEEN ET AL.
ratio that was observed was much lower: 29–1. With that, the number of 
teachers to students actually exceeds the norm of 40–1.
Scholastic inputs are also lacking. This was already pointed out in 
the previous chapter. There are important input deficiencies that make 
teaching more difficult. Roughly one‐quarter (22.3%) of schools had the 
minimum infrastructure, primarily because only one school in four has 
functional, private, and accessible latrines. 14.6% of public schools have 
the minimum teaching equipment, and textbooks are only available half 
the time.
Togo’s outcomes are not unlike those of other African countries (see 
Table 4.10) which also show inadequate learning outcomes by pupils, 
a high fraction of unqualified teachers, a lack of teacher motivation as 
evidenced by frequent absenteeism and inadequate scholastic and infra-
structural inputs. In the remainder of this chapter we use the SDI data to 
unpack which of the various factors, teacher presence, scholastic materials 
or teacher knowledge is the key driver of student learning outcomes. The 
literature suggests a somewhat weak relationship between resources and 
student performance, which, in turn, has been associated with deficien-
cies in the incentive structure of school and education systems. Indeed, 
in Togo incentives for teaching staff are not great, as evidenced by the 
reliance on temporary staff and teaching assistants/volunteers and the 
frequent strikes that marred the SDI data collection (http://datatopics.
worldbank.org/sdi/). Therefore, scholastic materials alone may have a 
limited impact on the quality of education, yet it is possible that inputs 
are complementary to staff motivation, so coupling improvements in 
both may have significant impacts (see Hanushek 2006). As noted by 
Duflo et al. (2011), the fact that budgets have not kept pace with enroll-
ment, leading to large pupil–teacher ratios, overstretched physical infra-
structure, and insufficient number of textbooks, etc., is problematic. For 
Togo this is not entirely the case as budgets did keep pace with increases 
in enrollment. Yet while student teacher ratios did not increase, infra-
structure deficits remain huge. However, simply increasing the level of 
resources might not address the quality deficit in education without also 
taking teachers’ incentives and qualifications into account. In fact, we 
find that if only one thing can be addressed through public policy mak-
ing, teacher knowledge should be given the priority. Before turning to 
the analysis, however, we first present the SDI data.
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4.2  sdi dAtA
To date, there is no standardized set of indicators, at least not for Africa, 
to measure the quality of education. The SDI surveys attempt to fill this 
gap by providing a homogenous set of indicators for several countries, 
on learning outcomes as well as facilities and teachers characteristics. The 
datasets are collected over time, enabling governments and service pro-
vider to track progress within and across countries over time.1
The SDI data for Togo were collected in 2013 from a representa-
tive sample of 200 primary schools, 1141 teachers, and 1938 grade four 
pupils. To get a reliable measure of teacher presence, schools were vis-
ited twice, each time unannounced. During the period of data collection, 
there were a number of strikes, both by civil servants and employees of 
faith‐based schools that were felt differently in rural and urban areas and 
the SDI results reflect these realities. First visits were reprogrammed to 
the extent possible so that teams conducted the first visits on days when 
there were no strikes. However, second visits were allowed to fall on 
strike days to reflect the reality faced by pupils (Rockmore 2016).
The results provide a representative snapshot of the quality of ser-
vice delivery and the physical environment within which services are 
delivered in public primary schools. In addition to information about stu-
dent knowledge, the SDI provides information on three levels of service 
delivery: measures of (i) teacher effort; (ii) teacher knowledge and ability; 
and (iii) the availability of key inputs, such as textbooks, basic teaching 
equipment, and infrastructure (such as sanitation, quality of lighting etc.). 
The test used to assess the pupils’ level of knowledge is a standard, grade 
specific test. The SDI survey instrument was adapted to the Togolese con-
text through a participatory process involving technical discussions, train-
ing, and piloting with the Ministry of Education’s National (Education) 
Evaluation Commission (Commission nationale d’évaluation; CNE). The 
tests assess the ability to do basic reading and arithmetic through a test 
articulated in three main sections: French, mathematics, and non-verbal 
reasoning. In the French vocabulary task, for instance, the pupils have 
to know the correct French words for four subjects drawn as pictures (a 
tree, an elephant, a pair of shoes, a t-shirt); in the ordering number task 
pupils should rank in ascending order a series of six number below 1000; 
1 See also http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/What_is_SDI.
pdf.
64  J. HOOGEVEEN ET AL.
finally, the non-verbal reasoning section is composed by four simple exer-
cises where the pupils are asked to choose among a series of geometrical 
figures or patterns having different shape, color, and texture which one 
among the six options available would fit with those stated as in the ques-
tions. More detail about the SDI test can be found in Box 4.1.
Box 4.1 SDI test
Pupils tests
French Reading–decoding exercises:
Pupils’ reading and decoding skills, as well as the knowledge 
of French vocabulary, are tested through exercises based on 
graphological and iconographical identification:
• Letter recognition: pupils are asked to be able to identify a 
specific letter among a set of nine (the exercise is repeated 
three times)
• Word recognition: pupils are asked to be able to identify 
a specific French word among a set of nine (the exercise is 
repeated three times)
• Vocabulary: pupils are asked to be able to state the correct 
French words for four subjects drawn as pictures (a tree, an 
elephant, a pair of shoes, a t-shirt)
Reading comprehension exercises:
• Reading Short Sentence: pupils are asked to be able to 
correctly read aloud a short sentence eight words long
• Reading Long Sentence: pupils are asked to be able to 
correctly read aloud a long sentence seventy words long
• Reading Comprehension: pupils are asked to answer to 
three simple questions about the long sentence previously 
read
Mathematics Numbers:
Pupils’ basic arithmetic skills are tested through exercises based 
on counting, numbers recognition, and ranking:
• Number Recognition: pupils are asked to be able to iden-
tify a specific number among a set of nine (the exercise is 
repeated three times)
• Ordering Numbers: pupils are asked to be able to rank in 
ascending order a series of six number below 1000
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Pupils tests
Four basic operations:
Pupils’ basic arithmetic skills are tested through exercises based 
on the four basic operations (addition, subtraction, multipli-
cation, division)
• Single-digit Addition
• Double-digit Addition
• Triple-digit Addition
• Single-digit Subtraction
• Double-digit Subtraction
• Single-digit Multiplication
• Double-digit Multiplication
•Triple-digit Multiplication
• Single-digit Division A
• Single-digit Division B
Analytical skills:
Pupils’ analytical skills are tested through exercises which require 
a combination of critical thinking and basic arithmetic skills
• Comparing Ratios: pupils are asked to be able to compare 
the results of three ratios
• Problem Solving A: pupils are asked to be able to solve a 
problem which requires the use of multiplication
• Problem Solving B: pupils are asked to be able to identify 
the number that will follow in a sequence of four numbers
Non-verbal reasoning Logic:
Pupils’ reasoning abilities are tested through a series of four 
puzzles
• Shape Recognition A: pupils are asked to be able to choose 
among six geometrical figures or signs having different 
shape, color, and texture which figure or sign would be fit 
to complete the sequence of four
• Shape Recognition B: pupils are asked to be able to choose 
among six geometrical figures or signs having different 
shape, color, and texture which figure or sign would be fit 
to complete the sequence of four
• Pattern Recognition A: pupils are asked to be able to 
choose among six geometrical figures or signs having differ-
ent shape, color, and texture which figure or sign would be 
fit to complete the sequence of four
• Pattern Recognition B: pupils are asked to be able to 
choose among six geometrical figures or signs having differ-
ent shape, color, and texture which figure or sign would be 
fit to complete the sequence of four
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4.3  descriptive evidence
4.3.1  Pupils’ Knowledge
To provide a meaningful but compact snapshot of the pupils’ general 
knowledge, we decided to select, as four key indicators, the average score 
to the vocabulary question, the joint non-verbal reasoning exercises, the 
single-digit multiplication, and the double-digit multiplication questions. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the average score in percentage points for the 
specific questions asked in each section. Table 4.4 illustrates the ratio of 
pupils with correct answers by region and rural areas.
Looking at the mathematical skills (Table 4.2) the poor performance 
by pupils is striking. Ordering number is known by only half the stu-
dents. Results are (somewhat surprising) better for the percentage of 
pupils able to do single-digit addition. The lowest and dramatic score 
is on double-digit multiplication, which shows that pupils do not know 
the method to solve the operation, when the operation cannot be solved 
using one’s own fingers.
Pupils’ average test score in non-verbal reasoning is particularly 
homogeneous both across regions and area if compared to the other key 
indicators. Table 4.4 shows that there is no relevant difference in average 
score computed in specific regions or area with the only exceptions of 
Savanes, Kara and Plateaux where, on average, children perform slightly 
worse than their peers who live in other regions.
A look at the distribution (Fig. 4.1) of the pupils’ score reveals a dis-
tribution across private schools mirroring that in public schools, with pri-
vate schools showing a much higher ratio of pupils with higher scores. 
The differences in pupils’ test score between public and private schools 
are largely driven by the results of the French test: a possible explanation 
could be the fact that children going to private school are more likely 
to speak (or be exposed to) French at home given that may come from 
wealthier and more educated family backgrounds (Figs. 4.2, 4.3 and 5.2) 
and most likely they live in Lomé. This explanation is reinforced by the 
finding that teachers in public and private schools do about equally well 
on the French test (Table 4.5).
The distribution of math scores (Fig. 4.3) is less skewed than the total 
one, showing a bigger mass at central values, with a vast majority whose 
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math score is below 50% in public schools, the picture is again mirrored 
in private schools, albeit more centered toward the middle of the dis-
tribution. The average score distribution shows a marked difference in 
the distribution, as well as in the average values as previously shown. 
Public schools show an alarmingly large number of pupils with around 
zero scores while this evidence is not present at this extent in the private 
schools. This evidence shows that there is a significant group of pupils 
who are not learning at all.
Finally, Table 4.3 provides a snapshot of the correlation existing 
among the scores achieved by pupils in the three subjects. Although 
statistically significant different from zero the correlations among test 
scores widely differ across areas, showing the highest correlation between 
French and math (around 60%), while the correlation is lower between 
non-verbal reasoning and math (and French too), not reaching 20%. It 
suggests that non-verbal reasoning measures something that is very dif-
ferent from math and French.
Table 4.2 Descriptive SDI test results
Weighted Average Score in percentage points. Division in (1) A: one-digit number divided and one-digit 
number divisor B: two-digit number dividend and one-digit number divisor
Source Our elaborations on SDI data
Mathematics Non-verbal reasoning
Variable Mean Variable Mean
Number Recognition 98.45 Shape Recognition A2 88.22
Ordering Numbers 52.60 Shape Recognition B 77.76
Single-digit Addition 76.47 Pattern Recognition A3 38.79
Double-digit Addition 64.63 Pattern Recognition B 7.98
Triple-digit Addition 64.57 Total non-verbal Reasoning 53.18
Single-digit Subtraction 64.47
Double-digit Subtraction 20.77 French
Single-digit Multiplication 10.53 Variable Mean
Double-digit Multiplication 5.31 Letter Recognition 89.35
Triple-digit Multiplication 4.31 Word Recognition 77.17
Single-digit Division A1 35.05 Vocabulary 65.15
Single-digit Division B 11.11 Reading Short Sentence 42.38
Comparing Ratios 19.32 Reading Long Sentence 41.98
Problem Solving A 9.12 Reading Comprehension 16.89
Problem Solving B 13.18
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4.3.2  Regional Differences
Irrespective of test score, urban areas always do better than rural areas 
and pupils in the Golfe-Lomé region always outperform those in other 
regions (note however, that this region is also almost entirely urban and 
with a high prevalence of private schools). With regard to the French 
vocabulary question (Table 4.4), which tested the ability of pupils to 
write the French word for four different pictures, pupils attending a 
school located in an urban area perform better than the other ones. In 
terms of regions, on average, children located in the mostly urban Golfe 
Lomé outperform the national average (88.2 percentage points against 
65.2 percentage points). With respect to math (single or double-digit 
multiplication) pupils in Golfe-Lomé score higher (16.4% for single-digit 
multiplication; 15.6% of double-digit multiplication) than those in any 
other region. Particularly for double-digit multiplication the difference 
is stark as there is no region where more than 5% manage to successfully 
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
6
0 .5 1
0 .5 1
0 1
TotalD
en
si
ty
pupiltest_score
Graphs by private
Fig. 4.1 Distribution of pupils’ average scores across public (0) and private (1) 
(Source Authors’ calculations using SDI data)
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complete double-digit multiplication. That said, even the score for Lomé 
is dismal. The difference in score for non-verbal reasoning is relatively 
small, with all regions scoring between 47 and 57 percentage points. The 
superior performance of Golfe-Lomé is much stronger for vocabulary 
than for maths, and least for non-verbal reasoning, suggesting that the 
main difference with other regions (and between urban and rural areas) 
is language related rather than differences in analytic skills or reasoning.
4.3.3  Teachers Knowledge
The unique feature of this dataset allows researchers to know the 
scores for teachers as well as for students. Teachers were tested with 
similar questions administered to students, at a slightly higher level of 
difficulty. The average scores show an impressively low level, with math-
ematical knowledge standing slightly below of 35% of correct responses. 
Expecting that a teacher should master the taught subject, an average 
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Fig. 4.2 Distribution of pupils’ French test scores (Source Authors’ calculations 
using SDI data)
70  J. HOOGEVEEN ET AL.
level of 80% (70% if you would like to be less ambitious) could safely be 
considered a lower threshold. The level of teachers’ knowledge is gen-
eral poor showing particularly low level in mathematical and pedagogical 
skills (see Filmer, Molina, et al. 2017). In Table 4.5 we show the average 
values by urban/rural and private/public schools. Difference in knowl-
edge of French does not show up overall, suggesting that the level of 
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Fig. 4.3 Distribution of pupils’ math test scores (Source Authors’ calculations 
using SDI data)
Table 4.3 Test score correlations
Source Authors’ calculations using SDI data
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Score French test Score math test
Score math test 0.5837*
0.0000
Non-verbal reasoning test 0.1786* 0.1989*
0.0000 0.0000
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knowledge of teachers does not differ widely. A remarkably low ratio of 
teachers has more than 70% of answers correct, a percentage of 13% in 
French and 15% in math. These numbers vary across schools, ranging 
from 17% in French in urban schools to 11% in rural schools.
The SDI dataset allows to further break down the urban/rural dimen-
sion across different regions (Table 4.6). As was the case for pupil test 
scores, teachers in Golfe-Lomé and teachers in urban areas score better 
than teachers in all other regions or those in rural areas. However, unlike 
the pupil test score, the French knowledge of teachers is substantially 
uniform (around 50 percentage points) across regions, and only slightly 
better in urban areas than in rural areas.
As previously demonstrated, teachers’ mathematical skills are quite 
poor. By looking at regional differences it can be seen how teachers 
located in the Golfe-Lomé region outperform their colleagues living in 
other regions of the country (43.1 percentage points against a national 
Table 4.4 SDI test scores of pupils by region and rural and urban areas
Variable which takes value between 0 and 1 according the fraction of correct answers to the vocabulary 
exercises. Percentage points, weighted results
Source Authors’ calculations using SDI data
Vocabulary Non-verbal 
reasoning
Single-digit 
multiplication
Double-digit 
multiplication
Golfe-Lomé 88.18 57.84 16.35 15.57
(0.19) (17.61) (37.02) (36.29)
Maritime 56.50 55.13 8.25 5.41
(30.09) (19.01) (27.55) (22.64)
Plateaux 61.28 47.11 12.78 2.16
(28.96) (23.02) (33.43) (14.54)
Centrale 63.30 56.84 9.43 2.49
(28.71) (22.55) (29.30) (15.62)
Kara 57.38 53.19 7.64 2.76
(31.32) (19.26) (26.63) (16.42)
Savanes 62.92 49.14 6.99 0.81
(28.03) (23.60) (25.55) (8.97)
Togo 65.15 53.18 10.53 5.31
(30.13) (21.11) (30.70) (22.43)
Rural 58.28 51.85 9.30 3.37
(29.43) (21.90) (29.05) (18.06)
Urban 80.71 56.22 13.32 9.71
(25.58) (18.89) (34.01) (29.63)
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average of 33.4 percentage points). Also, in this case, almost all urban 
areas perform better than the rural ones.
The teachers’ questionnaire contains a section dedicated to investigate 
their pedagogical skills; the range of exercises and questions asked help 
providing a snapshot of teachers’ ability to prepare and organize lessons, 
assess children’s ability, and evaluate students’ progress. Results from 
these questions are not encouraging. Teachers’ pedagogical knowledge is 
disturbingly low: the average ratio of correct answers (expressed in per-
centage points) varies from 15.8 of Plateaux region to 22.1 of Savanes 
with the national average reaching only 19.6 (Table 4.6).
4.4  AnAlysis oF vAriAnce
It might be interesting to investigate to which degree the variation in 
pupils’ test scores is driven by school level (including teacher qualifica-
tion) and individual level-characteristics. To explore this, we use a stand-
ard Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) model. The ANOVA model let us 
understand whether it is possible to claim that there is no significant dif-
ference in the means of pupils’ test score at school level, which makes 
the use of multivariate analysis important to detect the relevance of dif-
ferent drivers. It must be noticed that, since to the SDI dataset is based 
on information collected from 1938 grade four pupils randomly selected 
among 200 randomly selected school in Togo, the model takes form of 
One-way random effects ANOVA and then the results can be generalized 
back to the entire population (Table 4.7).
For each of the three tests the “Between Groups” line refers to the 
variation of the school mean around the population mean, the “Within 
Groups” line refers to the variation of the pupils’ scores around their 
Table 4.5 Distribution of teachers’ test scores
Source Authors’ calculations using SDI data
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Total Public Private % Diff. 
(public–private)
Urban Rural % Diff. 
(urban–rural)
Math 33.4 31.1 38.1 −22.5*** 41.2 29.9 27.5***
French 50.9 49.6 53.7 −8.2** 53.5 49.7 7.1**
Math >70% 15.3 13.1 19.7 −50.2** 24.5 11.0 54.8***
French >70% 13.5 12.2 16.1 −32.1 17.2 11.8 31.5**
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Table 4.6 SDI test scores for teachers by region and rural and urban areas
Source Authors’ calculations using SDI data
French Math Double-digit multiplication Pedagogical
Golfe-Lomé 52.38 43.14 59.00 20.38
(15.01) (26.20) (49.30) (13.48)
Maritime 51.65 35.17 52.65 22.10
(15.86) (25.39) (50.09) (16.94)
Plateaux 51.27 33.20 56.14 15.75
(17.18) (21.79) (49.77) (13.06)
Centrale 50.41 18.49 33.81 16.45
(19.35) (18.78) (47.55) (11.72)
Kara 47.72 21.73 37.45 21.07
(16.21) (22.71) (48.70) (14.50)
Savanes 49.59 37.57 52.66 22.08
(17.14) (28.71) (50.16) (18.01)
Total 50.90 33.36 50.90 19.61
(16.61) (25.55) (50.02) (14.95)
Rural 49.72 29.71 46.91 19.03
(16.85) (24.44) (49.95) (14.98)
Urban 53.48 41.36 59.65 20.89
(15.79) (26.14) (49.15) (14.85)
Table 4.7 Analysis of variance of SDI test scores
Source Authors’ calculations using SDI data
Analysis of variance—ANOVA
Source Sum of squares
(SS)
Df Mean square
(MS)
F Prob > F
ANOVA
French test score
Between groups 121.5492 194 0.6265 8.30 0.0000
Within groups 131.5854 1743 0.0755
Total 253.1346 1937 0.1307
ANOVA
Math test score
Between groups 24.1346 194 0.1244 6.83 0.0000
Within groups 31.7302 1743 0.0182
Total 55.8649 1937 0.0288
ANOVA
Non-verbal 
reasoning test 
score
Between groups 17.9613 194 0.0926 2.31 0.0000
Within groups 69.7676 1743 0.0400
Total 87.7289 1937 0.0453
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school mean, and the “Total” line refers to the variation of the pupils’ 
scores around the population mean. The F-statistics are given by the 
ratio between the groups Mean Square (MS) and within groups MS. 
In all the three case the null hypothesis that the average value of the 
dependent variable is the same for all groups is rejected; the within group 
MS is definitively smaller than the between group MS. This suggests that 
the differences between test scores are not solely explained by differences 
between students and confirms the relevance of school levels characteris-
tics (including teacher qualifications) in explaining pupils’ test scores.
4.5  regression AnAlysis
In this section we present the results of our regression analysis where 
we investigate how each factor affects pupil scores in math, French, and 
Non-Verbal Reasoning. We consider as dependent variable the scores in 
these topics (100% is the maximum score with all correct answers).
Multivariate analysis allows us to control for each factor, keeping 
other determinants constant, which allows us to purge our results by 
possible contamination with other inter-related factors.
Results are presented in Table 4.9.
Starting with the gender of the student, results show that scores 
are lower for girls, despite being significant in mathematics only. Pupil 
teacher ratios do not have the same impact on the three subjects. Larger 
classes have a negative effect on performance in French while it has a 
small and positive effect on non-verbal reasoning. Class size is not sig-
nificant in mathematics. Remarkably, absenteeism of teachers does 
not affect the final score results nor does teacher experience; having an 
assistant/volunteer teacher, on the other hand, is a critical driver, par-
ticularly in French. The presence of assistant teachers shows the high-
est (negative) impact, by decreasing French marks by 60 percentage 
points versus five in mathematics. The availability of books does matter 
with the exception of non-verbal reasoning where it is not significant. 
Interestingly, book availability has a higher impact for French than for 
math, suggesting that improving performance by simple providing addi-
tional text books is more difficult in conceptual topics like mathematics. 
In fact, the results suggest that the way to address improvements in test 
scores may vary by subject. For a subject like math, having a text book is 
as important as having a qualified teacher. For French, having a qualified 
teacher is much more critical than the availability of textbooks.
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Multivariate analysis confirms what was reported earlier that bet-
ter learning outcomes are found in private schools, with private schools 
exhibiting the highest coefficients: students at private schools score 
9 percentage points more in their math test than their public-school 
peers; in French the gap is the highest with 20 percentage points of dif-
ference. Let us remind the reader that our dataset does not collect infor-
mation on parental background, including wealth. Attending a private 
school versus a public one could be endogenously driven by the wealth 
of the family. Given these features of the data, the private school effect 
is likely to be driven by a wealth effect, rather than a school effect. 
Students coming from richer families are more likely to go to private 
schools (Fig. 5.2). Controlling for the quality of teachers, private schools 
Table 4.8 Summary of variables used in the regression analysis
Source Authors’ calculations using SDI data
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent variables
Pupils’ mathematics score 44.48 16.98
Pupils’ French score 45.38 36.15
Pupils’ non-verbal reasoning score 53.47 21.28
Independent variables
Female 0.51 0.50
Urban 0.31 0.46
Private 0.26 0.44
Pupil–teacher ratio 48.09 16.17
Toilets 0.57 0.49
Presence at school (rate) of non-assistant teachers 0.22 0.28
Multi-grade classes 0.39 0.49
Pupil had breakfast 0.73 0.44
Number of classrooms 6.38 2.58
Share of pupils with pencils 0.88 0.17
Share of female teachers 0.18 0.20
Share of assistant/volunteer teachers 0.32 0.26
Average years of education of teachers 6.86 0.87
Average years of teaching 12.02 4.30
Parents’ association 1.07 0.26
Number of meetings 1.23 0.63
Share of pupils with mathematics textbook 0.66 0.34
Share of pupils with French textbook 0.73 0.32
Share of pupils with textbook 0.69 0.34
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perform better, which can be easily explained by the demand side rather 
than by the quality of supply (which is controlled for). The gap is larger 
in French, which is also a better proxy for belonging to richer families, 
more exposed to French language.
It is worth remarking that the ratio of female teachers positively 
affects the performance, with the exception of math, this probably sug-
gesting additional effort, which cannot be controlled by regression anal-
ysis being unobserved. Since the ratio of female staff in public schools is 
only 14%, this is another area for attention.
Some of the school inputs that traditionally get quite some attention 
from donors, such as toilets or whether a child had breakfast (school 
feeding) do not seem to affect test scores. Surprisingly, parental associa-
tions matter in a negative way, even after controlling for the frequency of 
the meetings. This could be explained by the endogeneity of the variable. 
Parental associations are a choice variable, and they could be more likely 
to occur when student results are poor, or in isolated (rural) areas where 
the only schools available are (former) local initiative schools (EDIL) 
which were started and run by parents (Table 4.9).
4.6  concluding remArks
The SDI results for Togo are not out of line of those for other coun-
tries in the region. These countries too, face inadequate student learning, 
unqualified teachers, low teacher motivation, and insufficient scholastic 
and infrastructural resources. Clearly there are differences attributable 
to country specificities though. Learning outcomes are better in Kenya, 
for instance, even though the average time spent by teachers in Kenya is 
comparable to that in other countries (see Table 4.10).
One of the consequences of the free education program in Togo 
seems to have been that many ill-qualified assistant teachers entered the 
school system. And as Table 2.2 demonstrates, the hiring of temporary 
staff and teaching assistants has continued since. After all, within the 
public school system there is a strong reliance on teaching assistants and 
temporary staff, staff getting paid half, or less than half, compared to 
what their civil servant colleagues make and who make up 60% of the 
staff complement. Yet this is not the entire story. When only 2.7% of 
teachers can satisfactorily complete their test, the 40% of teachers who 
are civil servants and who presumable completed their training at teacher 
colleges are deficient in their knowledge too!
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Table 4.9 Regression analysis on pupils’ scores
Source Authors’ calculations using SDI data
Marginal effects reported, change in dependent variable is reported when the regressor is a dummy
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Math French NVR
b/se b/se b/se
Female pupil −4.546*** −3.689 −0.922
(0.848) (2.502) (0.991)
Urban-school 0.687 −8.381** 1.392
(1.227) (3.906) (1.383)
Private-school 8.515*** 20.018*** 0.797
(1.332) (4.196) (1.504)
Pupil teacher ratio −0.021 −0.205** 0.055*
(0.029) (0.097) (0.034)
Toilet −1.749 −1.504 −2.274*
(1.069) (3.595) (1.224)
Presence at school of non-assistant teachers 3.246** −8.172 0.010
(1.632) (5.449) (1.868)
Multi-grade classes 0.282 −0.886 −3.180**
(1.034) (4.130) (1.243)
Pupil had breakfast −0.231 2.935 0.090
(0.993) (2.813) (1.139)
Number of classrooms 0.859*** −0.907 0.143
(0.192) (0.756) (0.226)
Share of students with pencil 3.108 1.861 −1.846
(3.032) (8.080) (3.299)
Share of female teacher −1.742 15.236** 6.659**
(2.629) (7.422) (2.926)
Share of assistant/volunteer teachers −5.053** −59.139*** −2.874
(2.368) (8.411) (2.814)
Average years of education teacher 1.995*** 2.425 0.922
(0.609) (2.083) (0.732)
Average years of teaching 0.211* −0.405 −0.149
(0.112) (0.406) (0.135)
Parent association −3.917* −5.270 −3.786*
(2.291) (4.690) (2.184)
Number of meetings 0.036 −1.934 −0.345
(0.821) (2.476) (0.945)
Share of pupils with math textbook 7.449***
(1.510)
Share of pupils with French textbook 12.247***
(4.394)
Share of pupils with textbook 0.662
(1.715)
N 1233.000 605.000 1838.000
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The evidence shown in this chapter points at a weakness of the system 
that goes beyond the marginal impact of some factors. Indeed, average 
values of pupils’ learning outcomes shown in this chapter point toward 
such an insufficiency in the level of learning, such a deep learning cri-
sis, that it needs massive public action to address, and not by changes at 
the margin. Looking at the most effective forces behind learning out-
comes, two factors stand out as pivotal: private school attendance and 
the low presence of teaching assistants or volunteers. Whereas the former 
can plausibly be attributed to demand forces i.e. family background, the 
latter relates to supply dynamics. Teachers qualifications mirror, indeed, 
school public investment into human capital. Private school attendance, 
conversely, reveals a parental choice, which hides the family welfare, bet-
ter off households more likely to send their kids to private schools. This 
is particularly consistent across all outcomes, while other factors, when 
relevant, are often limited to having an impact on outcome. Private 
school attendance can offset the negative factors such as higher presence 
of voluntary teachers, by suggesting that wealth effect of the parent can 
neutralize the negative supply side effect.
Appendix
Regression Variables Description
Dependent Variables
Pupils’ mathematics score (total_math_score): variable which defines 
the pupils’ total score in the math section, it is expressed in percent-
age points
Pupils’ French score (total_lang_score): variable which defines the 
pupils’ total score in the French section, it is expressed in percent-
age points
Pupils’ non-verbal reasoning (total_nvr_score): variable which defines 
the pupils’ total score in the non-verbal reasoning section, it is 
expressed in percentage points.
Independent Variables
Female (female): dummy variable which takes value 1 if the pupil is 
girl and 0 otherwise
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Urban (urban): dummy variable which takes value 1 if the school is 
located in an urban area and 0 otherwise
Private (private): dummy variable which takes value 1 if the school is 
private and 0 otherwise
Pupil–Teacher Ratio (pupil teacher ratio): variable which defines the 
number of students per teacher (values from 0 to 113)
Toilets (toilet): dummy variable which takes value 1 if the school has 
toilets and 0 otherwise
Presence rate non-assistant teachers: variable which defines the percent-
age of the non-assistant teacher is present at school, values from 0 to 1
Multi-grade classes: dummy variable taking value 1 if in the school 
there are multi-grade classes (our elaboration)
Student had Breakfast: dummy variable taking value 1 if the child had 
breakfast and 0 otherwise (our elaboration)
Number of classroom: number of classrooms in the school has (values 
from 0 to 20)
Share of pupils with pencils: variable which defines the percentage of 
pupils having a pencil in a given school, values from 0 to 1
Share of female teachers: variable which defines the percentage 
of female teachers within each school, values from 0 to 1 (our 
elaboration)
Share of teachers: variable which defines the percentage of volunteer 
teachers within each school, values from 0 to 1 (our elaboration)
Average years of education of teachers: variable which defines how 
many years of education have on average the teachers in a given 
school, values from 4.33 to 9 (our elaboration)
Average years of teaching: variable which defines by how many years 
on average the teachers teach in a given school, values from 2.25 to 
25.375 (our elaboration)
Parents’ association: dummy variable which takes value 1 if in the 
school is active a parents’ association and 0 otherwise
Number of meetings: variable (in logarithm) which describes the 
number of meetings held by parents’ association during the year
Share of pupils with mathematics textbook: variable which defines the 
percentage of students having a mathematics textbook in a given 
school, values from 0 to 1
Share of pupils with French textbook: variable defining the percentage 
of students having a French textbook in a given school, values from 
0 to 1
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Share of pupils with textbook: variable defining the percentage of stu-
dents having a textbook in a given school, values from 0 to 1.
Table 4.10 Key SDI results for schools in Togo and selected African countries
Togo Kenya Mozambique Nigeria Tanzania Uganda
2013 2012 2014 2015 2014 2013
Teacher 
knowledge 
(4th grade)
Minimum 
knowledge
1.6 40.4 0.3 0.0 21.5 19.5
Test score 
(out of 100)
35.6 57.1 26.9 33.3 48.3 45.3
Teacher effort
School 
absence rate 
(% teachers)
20.5 14.1 44.8 16.6 14.4 26.0
Classroom 
absence rate 
(% teachers)
35.8 42.1 56.2 27.0 46.7 52.8
Time spent 
teaching per 
day
3 h 29 m 2 h 49 m 1 h 41 m 4 h 23 m 2 h 46 m 3 h 18 m
Scheduled 
teaching time 
per day
5 h 29 m 5 h 37 m 4 h 17 m 5 h 40 m 5 h 54 m 7 h 18 m
Resource 
availability
Student–
teacher ratio 
(observed)
29.7 35.2 21.4 38.1 43.5 47.9
Textbook 
availability 
(percent of 
students)
68.5 48.0 68.1 8.7 25.3 5.0
Teaching 
equipment 
availability (% 
classrooms)
26.4 78.8 76.8 23.4 61.4 80.6
(Continued)
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Source Adapted and updated from Rockmore (2016). Togo SDI Report, page i
Note Values for Nigeria are the weighted average of the four states surveyed: Anambra, Bauchi, Ekiti, 
and Niger. These statistics reflect the updated SDI methodology. Data for Mozambique are for the pub-
lic sector
Togo Kenya Mozambique Nigeria Tanzania Uganda
2013 2012 2014 2015 2014 2013
Infrastructure 
availability (% 
of schools)
22.3 59.5 29.1 19.7 40.4 53.7
Student learn-
ing outcomes
Combined 
math/lan-
guage score
45.7 72.0 20.8 21.3 40.1+* 48.6
French score 
(%)
45.5 75.4 18.7 21.7 36.5+* 47.1
Math score 
(%)
44.6 59.0 25.1 11.5 58.2 43.4
Table 4.10 (Continued)
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CHAPTER 5
Policy Suggestions and Concluding Remarks
Johannes Hoogeveen and Mariacristina Rossi
Abstract  In this concluding chapter, we summarize the main findings 
and offer policy suggestions. As the outcome of inadequate learning goes 
hand in hand with the poor quality of teaching, policy interventions have 
to embrace programs that radically address the problem. Marginal poli-
cies by themselves are unlikely to be sufficient but can be combined with 
intensive programs aimed at reversing the inadequate learning outcomes. 
Identifying successful programs is likely to require an involved search 
process of trying different approaches and scaling up what works best.
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competence · Iterative intervention design
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5.1  summAry oF mAin Findings
In the course of this book, evidence was presented on the state of learn-
ing by primary school students in Togo. We made use of several data sets, 
both administrative and survey microdata. Irrespective of the source used, 
the available data suggest that the abolishment of school fees improved 
access considerably, particularly in the first year. In 2008/2009 enroll-
ment in public schools increased by some 30%, an increase that had sig-
nificant equalizing effects in that many more relatively disadvantaged 
children, girls, those from poorer households, those living in rural areas, 
or those living in the far north, ended up going to school.
While the achievements in terms of school access and inequality 
reduction are noteworthy, learning outcomes are unequivocally poor. 
The majority of students do not perform adequately when tested on 
math or French. Just to illustrate how bad the situation is, only 53% of 
students in grade four know how to order six random numbers under 
1000. In the absence of such basic knowledge, it seems plausible that an 
entire generation of children may grow into adults who participate in the 
labor market and in civil society, without being equipped with even the 
most rudimentary academic skills.
Another way to highlight the depth of the learning crisis is by con-
sidering performance at the level of schools. We do so in Fig. 5.1, which 
shows the percent of schools in which at least 70% of answers were given 
correctly on a grade-specific math test. As the graph shows, most schools 
have zero students who get 70% correct answers. In only 3% of the 
schools is more than half of students able to get at least a score of 70%. 
In other words, almost all schools fail their students entirely.
These results are particularly dramatic considering that spending on 
education increased significantly. Expressed as fraction of GDP spend-
ing on education almost doubled from 1.3% of GDP in 2006 to 2.4% 
in 2015; expressed on a per-student basis spending went up from FCFA 
24,000 in 2006 to FCFA 43,000 in 2015. It suggests that the invest-
ments government is making in public education is a poor one, some-
thing that many parents seem to have realized. Because, despite public 
primary education having become free and available for all, the fraction 
of children opting to go to nonpublic schools has remained unequivo-
cally high: around 30%.
In an effort to explore pathways toward improving learning outcomes, 
this book explored correlates of learning outcomes. We found that 
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certain policies are likely to improve outcomes at the margin: a better 
balancing of teachers and scholastic inputs across schools would reduce 
inequalities and improve efficiency and performance; stimulating involve-
ment of parents in the school could enhance the motivation of students 
and teachers. One noteworthy finding is that private schools perform 
better than public ones, a performance that helps explain why so many 
parents opt to send their children to nonpublic (religious or laic) schools. 
The better performance of private schools remained even after con-
trolling for the (slightly) higher quality of teachers engaged in private 
schools.1 In other words, there are other factors, in addition to bet-
ter-trained teachers, that make students in private schools perform bet-
ter. We suggest that a combination of selection effects rooted in higher 
motivation and more capable students are plausible reasons for explaining 
these results. Parents who pay for a private education of their children 
are more likely to motivate their children, and their children’s teach-
ers, to perform. This effect is corroborated by the fact that the parents 
????
????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ?????????
??????
????
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??????
???????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
Fig. 5.1 Percent schools by percent of students that answers at least 70% of 
math questions correctly (Source Authors’ calculations using SDI data)
1 Note though that while private schools perform better, their learning outcomes tend to 
be below the threshold, but only less so than public schools.
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themselves—having the resources to pay for private education have a 
higher socioeconomic status (Fig. 5.2)—, are likely to be better educated 
themselves and may be more motivated to assist their children in the 
learning process, by offering an intellectually stimulating home environ-
ment and by engaging with their children in homework.
Schools clearly can benefit from a greater availability of inputs and 
Chapter 3 showed that this is likely to improve performance. Yet the root 
problem of poor learning outcomes has less to do with whether students 
go to a public or private school, or the availability of scholastic inputs 
(though they matter), and more with the quality of teaching. Teachers’ 
knowledge is astonishingly low. Just to illustrate, only one in seven 
teachers is able to answer 70% of (grade 5) math or French questions 
correctly. In schools with the highest percentage of high-performance 
teachers, one in three teachers is able to do so. The quality of teaching 
is further affected by the reliance on assistant and temporary teachers 
(60% of the staff complement in public schools) and teacher absenteeism, 
which is astonishingly high. Absenteeism is highly correlated with being 
an assistant or temporary voluntary teacher, suggesting a relation with 
inadequate levels of pay. Indeed, the impossibility to recruit teachers of 
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ? ? ? ?
??????????????
???????????????
????
??????? ?????? ????? ?????? ??????? ?????????? ?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ????
Fig. 5.2 School attendance by socioeconomic status (Source Authors’ calcula-
tions using the 2015 QUIBB survey)
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good quality and resorting to cheaper fixes seems to be one of the drivers 
of poor learning outcomes.
Adding a temporal lens to our reasoning, it is worth recalling that 
Togo did not always have a learning crisis (see Fig. 2.7) and that the cri-
sis dates from before the abolishment of school fees. The learning cri-
sis emerged in 2010 when PASEC tests scores showed a massive decline 
relative to those of a decade earlier. The majority of students in 2000 
showed a satisfactory level of learning (around 70% of them in math 
in their fifth grade), while this percentage drops to 46% in 2010 and 
remains stable at that level thereafter. The decline cannot be attributed 
(solely) to the expansion of the school system, though, because students 
in grade 5 who had started their education career before free primary 
education was introduced also show a decline in learning similar to those 
in grade 2, who started after free primary education was introduced.
As the education system has been affected by multiple shocks, includ-
ing the prolonged economic crisis, the large influx of additional students 
and the incorporation of EDIL schools into the public school system, 
it is difficult to assess whether teachers’ knowledge declined because of 
adverse selection (the best teachers left), because unqualified teachers 
entered the system, or because increasing workload, and low pay, under-
mined teacher motivation. Irrespective of the cause, it is safe to conclude 
a massive effort is needed to (re)train teachers. Additional actions can 
be taken to improve learning, but these are likely to only improve out-
comes at the margin: a better balancing of teachers and scholastic inputs 
across schools; stimulating parental involvement; reducing absenteeism 
and improving supervision.
Box 5.1 Community participation and school performance
Unsurprisingly given the high-value Togolese citizens attach to edu-
cation, community participation at primary school level is almost 
universal, though the degree at which communities are active varies. 
Parents’ associations and school management committee activities are 
mostly related to procurement and financial management (including 
bidding, supervision of works, reception and distribution of scholas-
tic material, hiring of teachers, etc.) and less to monitoring school 
performance. Community participation has proven to be effective 
at reducing the costs of acquisitions, and a greater involvement of 
communities in monitoring school performance could be a catalyst 
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for improved education outcomes. This is explored in Togo by 
the Data Must Speak initiative cofunded by the Global Partnership for 
Education, Hewlett Foundation and the UNICEF Thematic Fund for 
education.
Initial findings suggest that schools with higher community partic-
ipation have a better health and nutrition environment (latrines, first 
aid kit, hand washing station, school canteen, nutrients distribution), 
more facilities (water, electricity, playground) and better learning con-
ditions (textbooks, seats). Beyond the health/nutrition environment 
and learning conditions, community participation is also associated 
with more pedagogic activities, including teaching staff meetings 
and pedagogic support. This despite the fact that school manage-
ment committees are not formally empowered to monitor school 
performance.
With respect to school performance, there are indications sug-
gesting that higher community participation is associated with lower 
dropout rates and higher pass rates at the end of primary school 
national exam, even after controlling for the positive influence of a 
better endowed school on performance—echoing findings presented 
in Chapter 4.
Community participation can have an indirect (through 
improved health/nutrition and learning environment) as well as 
a direct effect on school performance
Source Personal communications data must speak initiative
Better infrastructure and 
learning environment in 
schools
Reduced dropout and 
increased success at 
exams
Community participation 
and oversight
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5.2  whAt cAn be done?
How can learning be improved? Even when there is agreement that 
a massive effort is needed to improve the quality of teaching, it is not 
immediately evident how to go about it. An important aspect is the 
realization that there is a stock and a flow problem. The stock prob-
lem refers to the existing cohort of teachers whose skills and teaching 
methods need to be upgraded. The flow problem refers to future teach-
ers who have not yet entered the profession. Addressing the learning 
challenge requires different approaches for each group: the first group 
requires upgrading of their current skills, whereas the second group 
requires higher quality at entry in the profession. For this last group, it is 
somewhat simpler to envisage what is needed: greater selection at entry 
at teacher colleges and quality improvements of what is being taught at 
these colleges. This is not to suggest that the task is trivial. Higher qual-
ity individuals will need to be attracted to teacher colleges, with better 
salaries and better conditions, changes that will have major fiscal conse-
quences. Then even if you are able to attract people with better qual-
ifications and who are motivated to become teachers, they need to be 
equipped with proper pedagogical skills, requiring a retooling of existing 
teacher training institutes.
More challenging, however, is how to improve the quality of teach-
ing by the existing cohort of teachers. Given the poor performance of 
these teachers on the learning tests, improving their skills is likely to 
be an important part of the challenge. But how to upgrade the skills 
of 25,000 teachers in the public school system (and 13,000 additional 
teachers in the nonpublic system), in ways that do not disrupt the school 
year and which are affordable? Many approaches can be envisaged. Just 
to mention a few: One could decide to invest in teacher cascade train-
ing. In the context of sub-Saharan Africa where limited resources often 
hinder efforts to improve teacher quality, cascade training is often seen 
as a preferred model of professional development for teachers. A cascade 
approach entails central training of a group of teachers as change agents 
who will pass on their new knowledge by training a large number of 
additional teachers. A cascade approach could be combined with regular 
teacher evaluations which are used to identify which teachers are most 
in need of retraining. Retraining could then focus on the bottom 10 
or 20 percent (those who should not be in front of children teaching), 
while those who don’t improve during the retraining program could be 
90  J. HOOGEVEEN AND M. ROSSI
dismissed and replaced with higher quality, better trained teachers from 
the (retooled) teacher colleges.
Another approach could be the introduction of scripted instruction. 
This approach refers to teaching programs that have highly structured 
lessons, often with specific time allotments for teaching specific skills, 
and often word-for-word scripts of what the teacher is to say. Scripted 
instruction is advocated for schools where teachers have had inadequate 
teacher training and can be considered a way to standardize the qual-
ity of instruction. Critics say that such programs stifle teachers’ creativity, 
undermine teachers’ expertise, and fail to provide for the diverse needs of 
many classrooms. Advocates see it as the easiest way to provide teachers 
with the essential elements of effective reading instruction.
A fourth approach could be to introduce e-learning approaches, such 
as the flipped classroom concept. This is an approach that turns tradi-
tional teaching upside down. Instead of introducing concepts in class 
(by an under-skilled teacher) and then sending students off to do home-
work, students watch online or on preloaded tablet lessons prepared by 
expert teachers who introduce them to key concepts. Then students then 
use class time to tackle complex questions, working in small groups and 
under the supervision of their teacher.
All these approaches could help improve teaching in Togo, as could 
many other approaches including some which have been discussed in this 
book such as enhanced parental engagement, or a more equitable dis-
tribution of resources. Approaches could also be tried in combination. 
A cascade training can improve teacher skills and prepare them to use 
scripted lessons in their classroom. Scripted lessons can be combined 
with flipped classroom concepts. Flipped classroom approaches may be 
more suited for urban areas, where access to electricity (and the internet 
if this is needed) is more readily available, while scripted lessons may be 
more suited for rural areas.
The key point we’d like to emphasize is that it is not obvious from 
the outset which approach is most suited. Even impact evaluations, while 
essential in identifying the most promising approaches, are unlikely to 
give the necessary guidance as few will have been done in settings rel-
evant to Togo. So, adopting one approach at the exclusion of others 
seems unnecessarily limiting. Why not start agnostically by agreeing that 
change leading to improved learning in the classroom is urgently needed 
while acknowledging that it is not evident what exactly needs to be 
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changed. Next one could create an environment in which a systematic 
search for solutions is supported.
Such an approach would fall under what Andrews et al. (2012) call 
Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation or PDIA. They define four criti-
cal elements for approaches seeking solutions to complex problems, of 
which limited learning is one. These are:
1.  aim to solve particular problems (learning in this instance) relevant 
to local contexts via
2.  the creation of an environment that encourages experimentation 
and positive deviance, which gives rise to
3.  active, ongoing and experiential (and experimental) learning and 
iterative feedback, doing so by
4.  engaging broad sets of agents to ensure that solutions are viable, 
legitimate and relevant.
PDIA starts by asking—what is the problem, as opposed to defining 
the solution that should be adopted (step 1). Next teachers and head-
masters but also parents or school inspectors should be given the space 
to define their own approaches and solutions (step 2). These will often 
entail adaptations to solutions that exist already, which is sensible given 
that local agents have a unique understanding of the problems at hand. 
Solutions are likely to be attained through incremental steps as few 
people are likely to get it right the first time. Muddling through needs 
to be accepted as part of the search process. It implies taking a grad-
ual approach to addressing complex problems. Experimentation plau-
sibly has its greatest impact when connected with learning mechanisms 
(step 3). These ensure the dynamic collection and immediate feedback 
of lessons about what works and why. Active learning through real-world 
experimentation allows reformers to learn a lot from the small step inter-
ventions they pursue to address problems (or causes of problems). They 
learn, for instance, about contextual constraints to change in general, 
how specific interventions work (or not), and how these interventions 
interact with other potential solutions. Finally (step 4), in order to trans-
late workable solutions into permanent change in the system, broad sets 
of actors need to be engaged. The engagement is preferably to start from 
the beginning, as this creates a broad platform of people supporting the 
new approach, including parents, teachers, headmasters, school inspec-
tors, etc.:
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Togo is uniquely placed to adopt a PDIA approach to improve the ped-
agogical skills of the current as well as the future cohort of teachers. 
Togo’s citizens and authorities have demonstrated to greatly care about 
education, investing significant private and public resources to ensure 
their students succeed. Togo’s education system used to be a decent 
performer, suggesting that there exists institutional memory that can 
be tapped. Moreover, the education management information system in 
Togo is well developed and with adaptations suited to assess the impact 
of different experimental approaches. The management information 
system could also be complemented with other learning tools, such as 
Iterative Beneficiary Monitoring, which are light, cost-effective and have 
demonstrated to enhance learning by creating effective feedback loops.2 
And finally, Togo is at the sweet spot between not being too big to make 
experimentation a daunting task and being too small not to be able to 
do any real experimentation. With almost 5000 public schools, it pays 
to let different schools propose different approaches and experiment 
with them. Let some send their teachers to receive additional training; 
let others introduce scripted lessons; let a third group flip their class-
room; let other schools propose their own innovations: more involve-
ment by parents; classroom supervision by headmasters; school feeding; 
2 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/377031522917012963/Iterative-
beneficiary-monitoring-an-adaptive-approach-to-enhancing-the-implementation-of-World-
Bank-projects.
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a combination of teacher training and scripted lessons. Finally, do noth-
ing in the nth group. Now let the system run for some time, maybe 2 
years, maybe less, and analyze the results using quick tests and monitor-
ing feedback. Use this to find the most promising innovation and repeat, 
now introducing variations of this innovation.
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